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Abstract 
 
 
This study analyzes the implications of the proliferation of ROO and sensitive list under 
SAFTA and bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries with particular reference to Nepal. 
In this regard this study makes a comparative assessment of different ROO arrangements 
under different bilateral FTAs as well as under SAFTA and BIMSTEC with a view to finding 
out the relative flexibility of SAFTA ROO vis-à-vis ROO in other regional and bilateral 
FTAs in South Asia. In addition, this study also explores the impact of the sensitive list 
maintained by India, under SAFTA, on the rise in exports from Nepal to India. The study 
uses a partial equilibrium model, namely the WITS/SMART model, to simulate different 
scenarios. It appears that when there is no ROO requirement and there is no sensitive list, the 
South Asian countries, under a full SAFTA scenario, are able to increase their exports within 
the region quite substantially. India appears to be the largest gainer from such scenario. 
However, Nepal also turns out to be important gainer as her exports to the South Asian region 
as whole increase by around US$ 90 million. Interestingly almost all of hear export increase 
would be targeted to Indian market (99 percent) under such a scenario. The analysis on trade 
creation and trade diversion for Nepal suggests that under a full SAFTA scenario, the trade 
creation effect (US$ 160821 thousand) will be higher than the negative trade diversion effect 
(US$ 19454 thousand) resulting in a net trade effect equal to US$ 141367. It also appears that 
the revenue loss and welfare gains for Nepal, resulting from such a scenario, would be US$ 
90881 thousand and US$ 20486 thousand, In the second scenario, because of ROO (and 
assuming no sensitive list in India) 34 percent of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to 
India appears to be unrealized. In the third simulation, because of SAFTA sensitive list in 
India (and assuming no ROO) as high as 47 percent of the potential rise in exports from 
Nepal to India appears to be lost. In the final simulation, it appears that SAFTA ROO and 
sensitive list in India eats up more than two-third of the potential rise in exports from Nepal 
to India. It can therefore, be argued that since the value-additions of most of Nepal’s export 
products are very low, a 30 percent value-addition requirement under SAFTA as well as 
under the India-Nepal Trade Treaty would act as a significant barrier for her export expansion 
in India. This is also true for other LDCs in South Asia. Therefore, the problem of ROO will 
need to be resolved, keeping an eye on the manufacturing/processing capability of the LDCs. 
In addition, the other criteria of the ROO, namely the change in tariff head, under SAFTA 
should also be made consistent with those that are currently in force in the bilateral trade 
agreements within the SAARC region, which happen to be more liberal than the prevailing 
SAFTA rules. It also appears that SAFTA sensitive list is too stringent to allow significant 
rise in exports from the LDCs (in this case Nepal) to the Indian market. In almost all the 
cases, the products, which are included in the sensitive list, have significantly high export 
potentials. It can thus be concluded that if these sensitive lists are not phased out, there will 
be very little to gain from SAFTA by Nepal and other LDCs in this region. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In recent years, there has been increased interest in regional economic integration in South 
Asia. With the stalemate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations, it is expected 
that the interest in regional trading arrangements will increase further. Regional integration in 
South Asia got the momentum in 1995 when the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was signed. In early 
2004, the SAARC member countries agreed to form a South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA), which has become a parallel initiative to the multilateral trade liberalisation 
commitments of the south Asian countries. SAFTA has come into force since July 01, 2006, 
with the aim of boosting intraregional trade among the seven SAARC members. Some South 
Asian countries are also a signatory of inter-regional FTA initiatives such Bay of Bengal 
Initiative for Multisectoral and Technical Cooperation (BIMSTEC) FTA1 and Bangkok 
Agreement. Many South Asian countries have also signed bilateral FTAs among themselves 
and with countries outside the region.  Bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries, which 
currently operate in parallel with SAFTA, including those between: (i) India and Nepal; (ii) 
India and Sri Lanka; (iii) India-Bhutan; (iv) Pakistan-Sri Lanka; (v) Pakistan-Nepal (limited 
to trade in tea). There are also on-going discussion for bilateral FTAs between India-
Bangladesh, and Bangladesh-Sri Lanka. 
 
The proliferation of bilateral and regional FTAs has necessarily been accompanied by 
overlapping Rules of Origin (ROO). The main reason for the existence of ROO in FTAs is to 
prevent trade deflection, by which is meant that the country with the lowest external tariff 
acts as port of entry for the entire bloc’s imports, depriving partners of tariff revenue. 
However, the proliferation of ROO can lead to what Bhagwati termed as the “spaghetti bowl 
effect”.
2
 ROO induces efficiency costs in production and restricts market access.
3
 Complex 
ROO increases administrative, compliance and business costs, particularly for small and 
medium-sized enterprises, which have limited capacity to deal with them. Furthermore, the 
demands of negotiating multiple ROOs increasingly strains the scarce trade negotiation 
resources of many South Asian countries, particularly the least developed countries, which 
have limited trade policy capacity. 
 
Multiple ROO (e.g., value-added rules or changes in customs classification) arising from 
overlapping agreements among South Asian countries under different bilateral FTAs and that 
under SAFTA would have significant implications for enhancing trade and welfare in the 
region within SAARC framework. Depending upon how they are specified, ROO under 
                                                 
1 BIMSTEC FTA comprises of five South Asian countries, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Sri 
Lanka and two South-east Asian countries, namely Myanmar and Thailand. 
2 For a concise treatment, see Bhagwati (2002). 
3 There is small but expanding literature on this subject- see for example, Krueger (1993), Krishna and Krueger 
(1995), Krishna, K. (2005), Vermulst and Bourgeios (1994), and Brenton, P. (2003)  
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South Asian bilateral FTAs and those under SAFTA can – to varying degrees- restrict trade, 
misdirect investment, inhibit productivity growth and reduce welfare from levels otherwise 
attainable. SAFTA would be relatively less attractive to bilateral FTA among South Asian 
countries if its ROO is more restrictive and costly to those under later categories. Thus, any 
potential economic gains of SAFTA in terms of increasing trade and welfare would be diluted 
by bilateral FTAs. Consequently, SAFTA would lose its relevance to enhance trade and 
welfare among SAARC member countries.  
 
In addition to the ROO, all these bilateral and regional FTA agreements allow the member 
countries to maintain sensitive lists of products which will be outside of the trade 
liberalisation programme. It has been observed that under SAFTA the sensitive lists 
maintained by the developing countries in this region, especially by India, are too stringent 
and long to allow the LDC members expanding their exports significantly into the markets of 
these developing countries.    
 
Against this backdrop, the main objective of this study is to analyze the implications of the 
proliferation of ROO under bilateral FTAs among South Asian countries on SAFTA with 
particular reference to Nepal. In this regard this study makes a comparative assessment of 
different ROO arrangements under different bilateral FTAs as well as under SAFTA and 
BIMSTEC with a view to finding out the relative flexibility of SAFTA ROO vis-à-vis ROO 
in other regional and bilateral FTAs in South Asia. In addition, this study also explores the 
impact of the sensitive list maintained by India, under SAFTA, on the rise in exports from 
Nepal to India. 
 
 
II. Pattern of Trade in South Asia 
 
Any analysis on the impact of any regional or bilateral FTAs in South Asia should be 
preceded by an analysis on the existing pattern on trade in South Asia. The intra-regional 
trade among the South Asian countries is very low. Until 1951, total intra-regional trade in 
South Asia as a percentage of the region’s total trade was in the double digits. However, as 
South Asia became progressively more closed relative to the world market and also the 
political rivalry between India and Pakistan intensified over time, by 1967 intra-regional 
trade fell to just two percent of the region’s total trade. The share began to recover during the 
1990s and by 2002 it rose to 4.4 percent (Baysan et al, 2006).  
 
Figure 1 suggests that, in 2003, Bangladesh was the single largest importer in South Asia and 
accounted for 36.4 percent of regional imports followed by Sri Lanka, who accounted for 
26.6 percent. Nepal accounted for 14.5 percent of total intra-regional import. In contrast, 
Figure 2 indicates that in 2003, Bangladesh had the least share in exports to the region, after 
Maldives, which accounted for only 2.3 percent of the total regional exports. While India was 
the largest exporter accounting for over 77 percent of the total regional exports, Nepal 
accounted for 5.4 percent.  
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Figure 1: Country-wise Share (%) in Intra-SAARC Imports in 2003 
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Figure 2: Country-wise Share (%) in Intra-SAARC Exports in 2003 
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III. Pattern of Nepal’s Trade with her Neighbouring Countries 
 
Nepal’s trade with her neighbouring countries is very much dominated by trading with India. 
It appears from Tables 1 and 2 that Nepal trade very little with Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. After a long decline in relative importance, Nepal’s 
dependence on exports to India increased sharply – more than 50 percent during early 200os 
(Table 1). Karmacharya (2005) observes that the major underlying factors responsible for this 
trend are the long porous borders, free movement of people and capital, preferential trade 
treaty (signed in December 1996), special regime of payments between the two countries, a 
slowdown in exports to other key markets, and limited success in penetrating other regional 
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markets. Table 1 also suggests that Nepal’s export to other SAARC countries accounts for 
only about 1 percent of its total exports during the last eight years (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Direction of Nepal’s Merchandize Export Trade 
 
 Nepal’s Export Trade 
US $ Million Share in Total Exports (%) 
1970 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 1970 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
South Asia 39.0 73 360 380 350 432 99.0 20 48 61 54 58 
Bangladesh (.) 6.9 7.0 3.0 5.3 5.7 (.) 2 1 0.9 0.8 0.8 
Bhutan (.) (.) 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 0.1 
India 39 66 353 376 343 421 99 18 47 60 53 57 
Maldives (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 0.2 (.) (.) (.) (.)   
Pakistan (.) 0.1 0.3 0.8 1.0 3.8 (.) (.) (.) 0.1 0.2 0.5 
Sri Lanka (.) 0.3 (.) (.) 298 (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)  
ROW (.) 287 395 238 298 306 (.) 80 52 39 46 42 
Total 39 360 755 618 648 738 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Karmacharya (2005). Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), Nepal Rastra Bank; Nepal Overseas 
Trade Statistics (various issues), Trade Promotion Center. 
Note: (.) means negligible. 
 
With respect to import, India still accounts for more that 50 percent of Nepal’s total imports 
(Table 2). Nepal’s import from other SAARC countries is only about 1 percent of its total 
imports.  
 
Table 2: Direction of Nepal’s Merchandize Import Trade 
 
 Nepal’s Export Trade 
US $ Million Share in Total Exports (%) 
1970 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 1970 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
South Asia 61 464 756 772 929 1093 88 34 43 52 58 59 
Bangladesh (.) 12.0 2.7 8.2 4.3 9.2 (.) 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Bhutan (.) 5.3 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.3 (.) 0.4 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
India 61 444 747 759 921 1079 88 33 42 51 57 58 
Maldives (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Pakistan (.) 2.4 1.4 1.7 2.0 2.6 (.) (.) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Sri Lanka (.) 0.5 4.0 2.1 1.4 2.0 (.) (.) 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 
ROW 8 886 1017 724 686 774 12 66 57 48 42 41 
Total 69 1350 1773 1496 1615 1867 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Karmacharya (2005). Quarterly Economic Bulletin (various issues), Nepal Rastra Bank; Nepal Overseas 
Trade Statistics (various issues), Trade Promotion Center. 
Note: (.) means negligible. 
 
 
III. Rules of Origin in the Regional Trading Arrangements 
 
‘Rules of origin’ are the criteria used to define where a product was made. They are an 
essential part of trade rules because a number of policies discriminate between exporting 
countries: quotas, preferential tariffs, anti-dumping actions, countervailing duty (charged to 
counter export subsidies), and more. Because the preferential treatment provided for in a free 
trade agreement is usually granted only to products originating from members of that FTA, 
rules of origin are important. These are the criteria which determine the national origin of a 
product. The country of origin of a product is usually seen as the country where the last 
substantial transformation took place.  
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Enforcing and defining rules of origin for goods or services poses major problems. This issue 
has been very controversial in a number of agreements and trade unions and other critics have 
campaigned to highlight the ways in which rules of origin can be used and abused by 
governments and corporations alike. In particular there are concerns about the ease with 
which goods processed partly or fully in a third country can get duty-free access under a 
bilateral agreement by being re-exported with just enough processing to satisfy rules of origin 
requirements. This is further complicated by the fact that different bilateral free trade 
agreements use different criteria to set rules of origin. 
 
The proliferation of free trade areas and consequently of bi-lateral and regional trade 
agreements within the multilateral trading system have encouraged the use of preferential 
rules of origin. Such preferential rules of origin are aimed at distinguishing products that are 
entitled to preferential tariff treatment from products that are not (OECD, 2002). Though 
covered in Annex II of the Rules of Origin Agreement as the Common Declaration with 
regard to preferential rules of origin, they contain no prohibition barring them from being 
used as “instruments to pursue trade policy objectives.” Rules of Origin have become 
problematic mostly in the context of preferential trade agreements; exactly the arena where 
WTO rules do not apply (Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995).  
 
The 2001 Doha Ministerial declaration reaffirmed WTO’s commitment to the least developed 
countries (LDCs) through trade preferences and trade-related technical assistance (Brenton, 
2003).  It did so by laying down the objective of “duty free, quota free market access for 
products originating from LDCs” while also committing to “consider other measures for 
progressive improvements in market access for LDCs.” Schemes such as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) providing duty-free access to products from developing 
countries and other initiatives like the European Union’s Everything But Arms (EBA) 
Agreement are some examples of preferential treatment in tariffs accorded to both developing 
countries and LDCs. However, as much as these initiatives have been taken to “secure 
beneficial and meaningful integration into the multilateral trading system and the global 
economy” for the developing countries and LDCs, its objectives are undermined by the rules 
of origin criteria they impose.   
 
Apart from these schemes, rules of origin are used extensively in other preferential trade 
agreements like bi-lateral trade treaties and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). Nepal is a 
party to bi-lateral treaties with India as well as RTAs like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for 
Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the South Asia Free 
Trade Agreement (SAFTA). In such arrangements, members confer origin to products if a 
pre-specified proportion of its value added takes place within the union. By bypassing the 
multilateral trading system’s principle of most favoured nation (MFN), members of 
preferential arrangements make a politico-economic decision to exclude third parties from 
receiving any preferences. At the same time, if members of such arrangements face stringent 
rules of origin requirements, their exporters might opt to forego available preferences and pay 
MFN rates instead. Whether rules of origin requirements in preferential arrangements are 
actually beneficial or not is a matter for debate.  The importance of rules of origin has grown 
significantly as preferential agreements expand and countries have treated similar imported 
products differently according to where the product was made (Lazaro and Medalla, 2006).  
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Though justified as a means to avoid trade deflection4 particularly in preferential 
arrangements, rules of origin are also being seen as discriminatory trade policy instruments. 
Since the liberalization of tariffs barriers, countries have turned to narrowly drawn rules of 
origin as the second best means of providing a measure of protection to domestic industries 
(Coyle, 2004).  
 
 
3.1. WTO Agreement on Rules of Origin 
 
With a rise in the aforementioned issues regarding rules of origin, particularly those 
concerning the adoption of individual rules of origin requirements by WTO Members, a 
harmonization of the rules was sought. In order to make them simpler, uniform and stable, the 
Rules of Origin Agreement was adopted in 1994. The Agreement lays down guidelines for 
broad approaches in formulating the harmonized rules (Das, 1999). But this agreement is 
only confined to non-preferential rules of origin.  
 
This agreement is divided into four parts containing nine Articles and two annexes:  
• Article 1 in Part I of this agreement defines Rules of Origin as those laws, regulations 
and administrative determinations of general application applied to determine the 
country of origin of goods except those related to the granting of tariff preferences. 5  
• Article 2 in Part II covers the disciplines to govern the application of rules of origin 
and lists out disciplines applicable to all WTO Members during the transition period.6 
The work to harmonize the rules of origin is being carried out by a Committee on 
Rules of Origin (CRO) in the WTO and a Technical Committee on Rules of Origin 
(TCRO) under the auspices of the World Customs Organization (WCO).  
• Article 3 in Part II of the agreement outlines disciplines to be adhered to after the 
transition period.  
• Article 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 in Part III of the agreement outline Institutions, Information 
and procedures for modification and introduction of New Rules of Origin, Review, 
Consultation and Dispute Settlement respectively.  
• Article 9 in Part IV defines objectives and principles, work programme and the role of 
the committee in the harmonization of rules of origin.   
• Annex I outlines the roles and responsibilities of the Technical Committee on Rules 
of Origin.  
• Annex II covers the Common Declaration with regard to preferential rules of origin.  
 
For the determination of the origin of a product as defined in Article 9 of the Rules of Origin, 
there are several criteria, such as (i) substantial transformation: when a product is accepted as 
being wholly obtained in the country, there is no dispute on its origin but whenever a product 
is manufactured with a combination of imported and domestic materials, origin disputes arise. 
So far, in such disputes, origin is conferred to the country where the product is considered to 
have undergone ‘substantial transformation’. (ii) process criterion: Imported inputs are 
considered to have undergone ‘substantial transformation’ if the finished products fall under a 
                                                 
4 A situation where companies located in non-preference receiving countries might place a processing or 
assembly plant in a preference receiving country to take advantage of lower tariffs.  
5 The agreement only covers ROO used in non-preferential commercial policy instruments such as MFN 
treatment, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, safeguard measures, origin marking requirements and any 
discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas as well as those used for trade statistics and 
government procurement (WTO, 2006).   
6 The time period until the work on the harmonization of rules of origin is complete.  
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different HS code than they did when those inputs were first used in the manufacturing 
process. (iii) percentage criterion: If a certain percentage of value is added to the imported 
inputs, they are considered to have undergone ‘substantial transformation’. One way is to 
predetermine the maximum percentage of imported inputs in production. For example, the 
percentage value of imported inputs must not exceed 40 percent. The other way is to 
predetermine the minimum percentage of domestic inputs in the production process. For 
example, the value of domestic inputs used in the production process must not be less than 40 
percent.  
 
 
3.2. ROO under SAFTA 
 
The rules of origin criterion are contained in SAFTA as the SAFTA Rules of Origin in Annex 
IV of the agreement. Its Rule 5 contains a list of products or types of products
7
 which will be 
considered as wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting Contracting State. 
Besides the wholly produced criterion, SAFTA rules of origin also contain Single 
Contracting State Content criterion. It uses both the Process and Percentage criterion and 
outlines the conditions which will grant originating status to a Contracting State as follows:  
 
• The final product is classified in a heading at the four digit level of the Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System differently from those in which all the 
non-originating materials used in its manufacture are classified and 
 
• Products worked on or processed as a result of which the total value of the materials, 
parts or produce originating from other countries or of undetermined origin used does 
not exceed 60 percent of the free on board (FOB)8 value of the products and the final 
process of manufacture is performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting 
State. Least Developed Contracting States will be allowed a favourable 10 percentage 
points.  
 
It thus appears that SAFTA allows differential rules of origin for the LDC and non-LDC 
members. The ROO agreed under SAFTA are general in nature (i.e. one criterion for all 
products) barring 1991 products for which product specific rules are applied. SAFTA ROO 
requires that in order to enjoy the preference under SAFTA a product must undergo sufficient 
processing for changing the tariff heading from the non-originating inputs and for having 
value of at least 40 percent value addition measures as percentage of fob value. However, 
value addition requirements are lower for Sri Lanka and LDCs, which are 35 percent and 30 
percent respectively.  
 
In terms of regional cumulation, Members are eligible for preferential treatment if the value 
of inputs from other Members plus domestic value addition is not less than 50 percent of 
FOB9 value.  For domestic value content (value of inputs originating in the exporting 
                                                 
7 Rule 5, Annex-IV of SAFTA Agreement.  
8 It means that the seller pays for transportation of the goods to the port of shipment, plus loading costs. The 
buyer in turn, pays freight, insurance, unloading costs and transportation from the port of destination to the 
factory. 
9 Free on Board- It means that the seller pays for transportation of the goods to the port of shipment, plus 
loading costs. The buyer pays freight, insurance, unloading costs and transportation from the port of 
destination to the factory. 
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Member State plus domestic value addition in further manufacture in the exporting Member 
State), must not be less than 20 percent of the FOB value.  
 
 
3.3. ROO under BIMSTEC 
 
The idea of establishing Bangladesh-India-Thailand-Sri Lanka Economic Cooperation was 
first initiated by Thailand in 1994 to explore economic cooperation on a sub regional basis 
involving contiguous countries of South and South East Asia surrounding the Bay of Bengal. 
It was formally launched as BIST-EC (Bangladesh-India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic 
Cooperation) on 6 June 1997 in Bangkok with the adoption of the Bangkok declaration. In a 
special ministerial meeting, held in Bangkok on 22 December 1997, Myanmar was accorded 
full membership of the group, and following the Myanmar’s entry it was renamed as BIMST-
EC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation). At the 
Ministerial meeting held in February 2004, Bhutan and Nepal were welcomed as new 
members. Subsequently, the Grouping was renamed as “Bay of Bengal Initiatives on Multi-
Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).  
 
The draft proposal of BIMSTEC’s ROO was submitted during the Burma round talks during 
April 2006. Seven South and East Asian member countries of the (BIMSTEC) put their heads 
together on the most crucial issues. The developing countries - Thailand, India and Sri Lanka 
- proposed changes in customs tariff. Along with such change, India and Sri Lanka favoured 
35 to 40 per cent value addition. But the least developed countries (LDCs) - Bangladesh, 
Burma, Nepal and Bhutan - wanted to fix the ROO criteria only on value addition basis and it 
to be fixed at 30 percent. However, concrete decision on the ROO under the BIMSTEC 
agreement is yet to be taken.  
 
 
3.4. ROO under India-Nepal Trade Act 
 
Historically India has remained the largest trading partner of Nepal. Trade relations between 
Nepal and India are governed by bilateral treaties on trade. Nepal signed its first trade and 
transit treaty with India in 1950. They were subsequently renewed in 1960, 1971, 197810, 
1991, 1996 and 2002. The trade treaty that was signed in 2002 is due to be renewed in March 
2007. India and Nepal have signed three trade treaties. These are: 
 
1. India-Nepal Treaty of Trade: This treaty of trade to regulate bilateral trade was last 
revised and renewed for a period of 5 years with effect from 6
th
 March 2002 up to 5
th
 
March 2007.   
 
2. India-Nepal Treaty of Transit: This treaty was renewed in March 2006 for a period of 
7 years with effect from 1
st
 April 2006.  
 
3. India-Nepal Agreement of Cooperation to control unauthorised trade between the two 
countries:  This was last renewed for a period of 5 years with effect from 6
th
 March 
2002. 
 
                                                 
10 Trade was de-linked from transit 
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Nepal – India Treaty of Trade, 2002 is a continuation of the Treaty of Trade 1996 in a revised 
form. Some of the major provisions made in the treaty are exemption from basic customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions on imports of primary products on a reciprocal basis. 
Nepali manufacturing exports
11
 has been given access to the Indian market free of basic 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the basis of non-reciprocity. Also, 
manufacturing goods imported from Nepal have been granted preferential entry, without any 
quantitative restrictions. Preferential Access for Nepali manufacturing exports to the Indian 
market is subjected to Rules of Origin (ROO) conditions that have changed over time. The 90 
percent value added condition12of the 1960 trade treaty was reduced to 50 percent in the 1992 
treaty. Under the 1996 trade treaty, the value addition requirement was further reduced to 40 
percent of ex-factory prices
13
  and included the provision that ROO certificate could be issued 
by the FNCCI. The 1996 trade treaty also substantially reduced the negative list to include 
only items such as alcoholic liquors/beverages and their concentrates except industrial spirits, 
perfumes and cosmetics with non-Nepali/non-Indian brand names, cigarettes and tobacco. 
 
The Nepal- India Treaty of Trade, 2002 also introduced several changes in the ROO. Firstly, 
the new ROO provisions include domestic content value addition requirement of 30 percent 
of ex-factory prices and changes in tariff heading (CTH) at four digit level of the harmonized 
system code14. Secondly, this treaty emphasises clear specification of safeguard clauses. The 
treaty denotes "safeguards" against significant damages to the domestic producers, from an 
"export surge". Thirdly, a provision has been made for submission of information regarding 
the basis of calculating ROO to the Indian government by the Nepal government on an 
annual basis. 
 
 
3.5. ROO under India-Sri Lanka FTA 
 
India and Sri Lanka signed an FTA deal in 1998. The rules of origin under this FTA deal 
state that products worked on or processed as a result of which the total value of the 
materials, parts or produce originating from countries other than the Contracting Parties or of 
undetermined origin used does not exceed 65 percent of the f.o.b. value of the products 
produced or obtained and the final process of manufacture is performed within the territory of 
the exporting Contracting Party shall be eligible for preferential treatment, subject to the 
provisions of clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of rule 7 and rule 8.  
  
Non-originating materials shall be considered to be sufficiently worked or processed when 
the product obtained is classified in a heading, at the four digit level, of the Harmonised 
Commodity Description and Coding System different from those in which all the non-
originating materials used in its manufacture are classified.  
  
For cumulative rules of origin, in respect of a product, which complies with the origin 
requirements provided in rule 5(b) and is exported by any Contracting Party and which has 
used material, parts or products originating in the territory of the other Contracting Party, the 
value addition in the territory of the exporting Contracting Party shall be not less than 25 per 
                                                 
11 Except for those on the Negative list i.e., goods excluded from preferential treatment.   
12 For materials originating in India or Nepal 
13 'Ex-factory price' means the price of the product at the time of clearing from the factory gate. 
14 For Nepalese manufacturing exports, which cannot fulfill CTH criteria, the new ROO provision requires that 
these products have undergone a "sufficient manufacturing process within Nepal," determined on a case by 
case basis. 
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cent of the f.o.b. value of the product under export subject to the condition that the aggregate 
value addition in the territories of the Contracting Parties is not less than 35 per cent of the 
f.o.b. value of the product under export. 
 
 
3.6. ROO under Pakistan-Sri Lanka FTA 
 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Pakistan and Sri Lanka is operational from June 12, 
2005. Under the Free Trade Agreement, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have agreed to offer 
preferential market access to each others’ exports by way of granting tariff concessions. Sri 
Lanka would be able to enjoy duty free market access on 206 products in the Pakistani 
market including tea, rubber and coconut. Pakistan, in return, would gain duty free access on 
102 products in the Sri Lankan market. These products include oranges, basmati rice and 
engineering goods. 
 
Annex C deals with the rules of origin, which have to be complied with by the exporters of 
the two countries in order to qualify their products for preferential duty benefits. Based on the 
origin, the Rules of Origin categorize the products exported under the PSFTA into the 
following two main segments. 
 
a) products wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting country such as 
agricultural, fishery and mineral products.  
b) products, not wholly produced or obtained in the territory of the exporting country 
(manufactured products).  
 
All manufactured products falling under the category of “products, not wholly produced or 
obtained in the territory of the exporting country (manufactured products)” should contain a 
minimum of 35 percent of Domestic Value Addition of their FOB value in order to qualify 
for preferential treatments. Further, it is also necessary that all non-originating materials, used 
by the exporters change their HS codes at six-digit level against that of the final product as a 
result of the manufacturing process undertaken in the exporting country.  
 
The Cumulative Rules of Origin encourages exporters to source their inputs from the other 
contracting country. However, the Domestic Value Addition in the territory of the exporting 
country shall not be less than 25 percent of the FOB value of the final product, while the 
aggregate value addition in both contracting parties should be minimum of 35 percent of the 
FOB value. In addition, the respective products should also conform to the Change of HS 
code requirement (at six digit level) as in the case of the manufactured goods, referred to 
under category (b) above.  
 
 
3.7. A Comparison of ROOs under different Regional and Bilateral FTAs in South Asia 
 
Table 3 presents a comparison of different ROO requirements under different regional and 
bilateral FTA agreements in South Asia. The comparison is made on the basis of three 
criteria: the value-addition requirement, change in tariff heads and requirement for regional 
cumulation. It appears that in terms of value-addition and change in tariff heads requirements, 
SAFTA does not differ much from India-Sri Lanka BFTA and India-Nepal Trade Treaty. As 
an LDC, Nepal’s export products are subject to 30 percent value-addition requirement as well 
as are subject to change in tariff head at the four digit HS code. However, though the value-
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addition criteria under the Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA is similar to SAFTA, the provision for 
change of HS codes at six-digit level, has made the ROO of this BFTA relatively more 
flexible. In the case of regional cumulation, SAFTA appears to be more stringent than other 
BFTAs in South Asia.  
Table 3: Comparison of ROOs 
 
RTAs Value addition 
requirement 
Change in Tariff Heads Regional Cumulation 
SAFTA 30% for LDCs, 35% for 
Sri Lanka and 40 % for 
India and Pakistan 
Change in tariff head at 
the four digit HS code 
Value of inputs from 
other Members plus 
domestic value addition is 
not less than 50% of FOB 
value. Domestic value 
content must not be less 
than 20% of the FOB 
value.  
 
BIMSTEC Proposed: 35-40% for the 
developing countries and 
30 percent for LDCs  
Proposed: change in tariff 
head to be included in the 
ROO, but not yet decided 
Not yet decided 
India-Sri Lanka BFTA 35% Change in tariff head at 
the four digit HS code 
Value of inputs from 
other Member plus 
domestic value addition is 
not less than 35% of FOB 
value. Domestic value 
content must not be less 
than 25% of the FOB 
value.  
India-Nepal Trade Treaty 30% for Nepal. But, India 
doesn’t enjoy any 
preference  Therefore, 
India-Nepal Trade Treaty 
is silent about ROO 
(value addition) 
requirement for India's 
exports to Nepal. In 
actual practice, India's 
exports to Nepal have 
never been subjected to 
ROO requirements. 
Change in tariff head at 
the four digit HS code 
No mention 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA 35% Change in tariff head at 
the six digit HS code 
Value of inputs from 
other Member plus 
domestic value addition is 
not less than 35% of FOB 
value. Domestic value 
content must not be less 
than 25% of the FOB 
value. 
 
IV. Sensitive List: A Major Hindrance to Trade Expansion 
 
In addition to the ROO requirement, the sensitive list or the negative list act has a major 
hindrance to trade expansion in South Asia. Bayson et al (2006) analyse the political 
economy of the selection of excluded sectors and ROO. When countries are allowed to 
choose sectors that can be excluded from tariff preferences in an FTA, domestic lobbies make 
sure that the sectors in which they may not withstand competition from the union partner are 
the ones that get excluded. In addition, the ROO can also be subject to abuse by the 
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bureaucrat administering them. In cases where imports from the partner may be threatening 
an inefficient domestic competitor, bureaucratic discretion may be employed to block entry 
of the imports.  
 
4.1. Sensitive List under SAFTA 
 
The Agreement provides scope for maintaining of sensitive lists, which are not subject to 
tariff reduction programme. Although the Agreement maintains that sensitive list shall be 
different for LDCs and non-LDCs, only three countries namely Bangladesh, India and Nepal 
maintain different sensitive lists for LDCs and non-LDCs. Besides, the LDCs maintain longer 
sensitive lists than the non-LDCs. 
 
Table 4: Sensitive Lists among the SAFTA Members 
 
Country Total number of Sensitive List Coverage of Sensitive List  
as % of Total HS Lines 
For Non-LDCs For LDCs For Non-LDCs For LDCs 
Bangladesh 1,254 1,249 24.0 23.9 
Bhutan 157 157 3.0 3.0 
India 865 744 16.6 14.2 
Maldives 671 671 12.8 12.8 
Nepal 1,335 1,299 25.6 24.9 
Pakistan 1,191 1,191 22.8 22.8 
Sri Lanka 1,079 1,079 20.7 20.7 
 
However, a major flaw of the SAFTA Treaty is that it does not subscribe categorically to 
phasing out the negative list or eliminating non-tariff barriers (NTBs), let alone prescribing 
time limits for doing so. It only provides that the negative list shall be reviewed after every 
four years with a view to reducing the number of items.15 It is also a matter of grave concern 
for the LDCs in South asia, i.e., Bangladesh and Nepal with regard to the size of the negative 
list maintained especially by India. 
 
4.2. Sensitive List under India-Nepal Trade Treaty   
 
Under the India-Nepal Trade Treaty the MFN list of articles which will not be allowed 
preferential entry from Nepal to India are  
(i) alcoholic liquors/beverages16 and their concentrates except industrial spirits,  
(ii) perfumes and cosmetics with non-Nepalese/non-Indian Brand names, and  
(iii) cigarettes and tobacco.  
However, government of India may, in consultation with government of Nepal, modify this 
list. 
 
 
                                                 
15 There are also concerns about the size of the negative lists, as they appear to be too long. This will detract 
from the provision of Article XXIV of GATT which lays down that a free trade area should cover 
substantially all trade. 
16
 Nepalese beers can be imported into India on payment of the applicable liquor excise duty equal to the 
effective excise duty as levied in India on Indian beers under the relevant rules and regulations of India. 
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4.3. Sensitive List under India-Sri Lanka Trade Treaty 
 
Of Sri Lanka’s rather extensive negative list of 1180 items, a relatively high share of nearly 
623 products actually being imported from India stood to be excluded from receiving any 
benefits. By contrast, of the Indian negative list of 429 products, Sri Lankan exports consisted 
of only 50 items. Where both countries have offered zero tariff reduction, India’s export 
interests are again receiving only marginal benefits. Of 319 items on which Sri Lanka 
reduced its tariffs to zero, the actual number of Indian exports that received immediate 
benefits stood at only 3 items. By contrast, on the 1351 items on which India offered 
immediate zero tariffs, Sri Lankan exporters stood to gain from at least 68 products traded 
products.  
 
 
4.4. Sensitive List under Pakistan-Sri Lanka Trade Treaty 
 
The Negative list of Pakistan consists of 540 HS tariff lines (products) at six digit level. 
Being on the Negative List, these products will not be entitled to enjoy any tariff concessions, 
when imported from Sri Lanka. On the other hand, the Negative list of Sri Lanka contains a 
total of 697 HS tariff lines (products) at six digit level and these products will not be entitled 
to enjoy any tariff concessions, when exported to Sri Lanka. 
 
 
4.4. A Comparison of Sensitive Lists under different Regional and Bilateral FTAs in 
South Asia 
 
It appears that among all the regional and bilateral FTAs, the India-Nepal Trade Treaty 
possess least negative list for Nepal as far as Indian market is concerned. For example, under 
this trade treaty only three categories of products are specified in the Indian negative list, 
whereas under SAFTA, as an LDC, Nepal is supposed to receive no concession on the 
exports of 744 items at the four digit HS code to the Indian market. When compared to other 
bilateral FTAs, i.e., India-Sri Lanka BFTA and Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA, the negative lists 
of the SAFTA member countries appear to be too long.  
 
 
V. The Effects of ROO and Sensitive List on Export Expansion for Nepal: Simulation 
Exercises through WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model 
 
5.1. Rationale for a Partial Equilibrium Model 
 
There is no denying that trade policy analysis is more robust when undertaken within a 
general equilibrium modelling framework. This can be seen as the first-best option as general 
equilibrium models, not only measure the first-round effects of simulated changes, but also 
the second-round effects which include inter-industry effects and macroeconomic 
adjustments. However, Nepal is not individually captured in the GTAP modelling 
methodology due to lack of data disaggregation. Consequently, the partial equilibrium 
modelling framework lends itself as a second-best option.  
 
The main distinction that should be noted at the outset is that as a partial equilibrium model, 
the inter-sectoral implications (second-round effects) of a trade policy change are not taken 
into account, as is the case in the general equilibrium model. Similarly, the inter-regional 
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implications are also ignored in a partial equilibrium framework. The only point of 
convergence of the partial and general equilibrium models is that it is still possible within a 
partial equilibrium model to analyse the trade policy effects on trade creation and diversion, 
welfare and even on tariff revenues while holding everything else constant.  
 
Milner et al. (2002) provides a simple analytical framework explaining the theory behind 
partial equilibrium modelling and notes that to adequately capture the interactions between 
sectors and elasticities of substitution between factors, a general equilibrium model would be 
desirable. However, due to scarcity of individual and regional CGE models for developing 
countries then partial equilibrium models would be alternative choices. Milner et al. (2002) 
also raise a valid observation that the database for general equilibrium models lacks the 
commodity detail to take account of the specific sensitive and special products. Despite its 
shortcomings, a partial equilibrium framework is more suitable as it allows the utilization of 
widely available trade data at the appropriate level of detail to capture the principle of special 
and differential treatment in the simulation analysis. It however remains true that although 
partial equilibrium models have drawbacks, as a modelling approach they have the advantage 
of working at very fine levels of details such as at tariff line level. 
 
 
5.2. The WITS/SMART Model  
 
For the purposes of this study, it is proposed that the WITS/SMART model will be the 
applied partial equilibrium framework. The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) brings 
together various databases ranging from bilateral trade, commodity trade flows and various 
levels and types of protection. WITS also integrate analytical tools that support simulation 
analysis. The SMART simulation model is one of the analytical tools in WITS for simulation 
purposes. SMART contains in-built analytical modules that support trade policy analysis such 
as effects of multilateral tariff cuts, preferential trade liberalization and ad hoc tariff changes. 
The underlying theory behind this analytical tool is the standard partial equilibrium 
framework that considers dynamic effects constant. Like any partial equilibrium model, it has 
these strong assumptions allowing the trade policy analysis to be undertaken a country at a 
time. In spite of this weakness, WITS/SMART can help estimate trade creation, diversion, 
welfare, revenue effects and effects on exports for those countries whose data is available. 
WITS database comes from various sources. The external trade statistics comprise of UN 
COMTRADE, UNCTAD TRAINS and the WTO Integrated Data Base (IDB). The tariffs 
data is derived from UNCTAD TRAINS, WTO IDB and WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedule 
Data Base (CTS). The non-tariff measures are compiled from UNCTAD TRAINS database.  
 
The underlying analytics of the theory are clearly defined in Laird and Yeats (1986) and ECA 
(2000). The derivation begins with a basic trade model composed of simplified import 
demand and export supply functions and an equilibrating identity: 
 
A simplified import demand function for country j from country k of commodity i: 
 
),,( ikijjijk PPYfM =          (1) 
 
The export supply function of commodity i of country k can be simplified as: 
 
)( ikjijk PfX =           (2) 
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The equilibrium in the trade between the countries is the standard partial equilibrium 
equation: 
 
ikjijk XM =           (3) 
 
In a free trade environment, the domestic price of the commodity i in country j from country 
k would change with the change in an ad valorem tariff as follows: 
 
)1( ikjikjijk tPP +=          (4) 
 
In order to get the price equation, differentiating (4) we obtain: 
 
ikjikjikjikjijk dPtdtPdP )1( ++=         (5) 
 
 
Equations (4) and (5) are substituted into the elasticity of import demand function: 
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Using this, one obtains the change in imports: 
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In the similar process one can obtain, with the elasticity of export supply function, the change 
in exports: 
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Using (7) one can calculate the trade creation effect: 
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=       (8) 
 
Where ijkTC   is the sum of trade created in millions of dollars over i commodities affected by 
tariff change and miα  is the elasticity of import demand for commodity I in the importing 
country from the relevant trading partner. ijkM  is the current level of import demand of the 
given commodity i, while 0ijkt  and 
1
ijkt  represent tariff rates for commodity i at the initial and 
end periods respectively. According to the UNCTAD model, trade creation depends on the 
current level of imports, the import demand elasticity, and the relative tariff change and 
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occurs when there is a shift from higher cost producer to lower cost producer as a result of 
elimination of tariffs on imports from the partner. 
 
If γ  approaches infinity, then equation 8 can be simplified as follows: 
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=α        (9) 
 
The elasticity of substitution is expressed as the percentage change in relative shares of 
imports from two different sources due to a 1 percent change in the relative prices of the 
same product from the two sources. Conceptually, the elasticity of substitution is a 
measurement of the ease with which various imports can be substituted for one another. 
Technically, it is measured as the slope of the import isoquant. 
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In this equation, k denotes imports from the RTA member countries and K denotes imports 
from the rest of the world. 
 
Trade diversion occurs when an efficient producer from outside the free trade area is 
displaced by less efficient producers in the preferential area. Essentially, trade diversion 
depends on the current level of imports from RTA member countries and the ROW, the 
percentage change of tariffs facing imports from RTA member countries with those from 
ROW remaining unchanged, and the elasticity of substitution Mσ  of the imports between the 
RTA member countries and ROW into the concerned country. In the SMART framework, the 
trade diverted to the RTA member countries can be expressed as: 
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The strength of trade diversion depends on whether one assumes that goods are perfectly 
substitutable or whether goods are imperfectly substituted and whether calculations are made 
at official rates or on actual collected rates. 
 
 
WITS/ SMART has a very precise and elegant methodology for calculating revenue effects. 
The tariff revenue is the product of the tariff rate and the tariff base (value of imports). Thus, 
before the change in the ad valorem incidence of trade barriers, the revenue is given as: 
 
 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR ,,
0
0         (12) 
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After the change in tariff rate, the new revenue collection will be given by: 
 
 
∑∑=
i k
ijkijkijk MPtR ,,
1
1         (13) 
 
The revenue loss as a result of the implementation of any RTA is the difference between 0R  
and 1R . 
 
The WITS/SMART model estimation of welfare eﬀects is quite simple. This is unlike the 
equivalent variations measurement in general equilibrium models. Essentially, the welfare 
effect is mainly ascribed to the consumer benefits in the importing country as a result of 
lower import prices. This allows them to substitute more expensive domestic or imported 
products with the cheaper imports that are affected by the relevant tariff reduction. Increased 
imports leads to a net welfare gain that can be thought as the increase in consumer welfare 
and is measured as follows:  
 
)(5.0 ijkijkijk Mtw ∆∆=         (14)  
 
The coefficient of 0.5 captures the average between the ad valorem incidence of the trade 
barriers before and after their elimination/reduction. Equation (14) assumes that the elasticity 
of export supply is infinite. If this is not the case, the import prices in the importing countries 
fall by less than the full reduction in trade barriers. Therefore, while the equation can be used 
to measure welfare effect, it is no longer a representation of consumer surplus alone but has 
some element of producer surplus (Laird and Yeats, 1986). 
 
 
5.3. The Simulations 
 
It appears from the discussion in the aforementioned sections that the value-addition 
requirement under the SAFTA ROO is as good as that under any other bilateral FTA 
agreement in South Asia. Therefore, as far as the value-addition criteria is concerned, there is 
no problem in overlapping ROO in South Asia. However, the problem of overlapping ROO 
arises when the criteria ‘change in tariff head’ is considered, as it appears that only the 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA has the most liberal provision in this regard. Also, when the 
regional cumulation criteria is considered SAFTA appears to be the most restrictive one. In 
the case of sensitive list, SAFTA, also appears to be more stringent than any other BFTA. 
 
However, to run the simulations in the WITS/SMART partial equilibrium model and to 
observe the implications for Nepal, we can only use the information on value-addition in 
different sectors in Nepal (using the social accounting matrix of Nepal) as the information on 
change in tariff heads and regional cumulation is not available. Therefore, when only the 
value-addition criteria is used, there is no distinction between SAFTA and the India-Nepal 
Trade Treaty as far as the interests of Nepal is concerned.  
 
In the WITS/SMART model we therefore, simulate the SAFTA scenario by taking into 
account the ROO and sensitive list. In all the simulations bilateral tariff rates for the SAFTA 
member countries are reduced down to zero. Four simulations have been run and they are:      
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Simulation 1: No ROO and sensitive list under SAFTA 
 
Simulation 2: ROO restriction for Nepal under SAFTA and India-Nepal Trade Treaty (no 
sensitive list) 
 
Simulation 3: Sensitive List restriction for Nepal under SAFTA (no ROO restriction) 
 
Simulation 4: ROO restriction and sensitive list restriction under SAFTA for Nepal 
 
 
5.3.1. Simulation 1: Impact of SAFTA on the Member Countries with no ROO and 
Sensitive List  
 
The results of simulation 1 are reported in Tables 5. It appears that when there is no ROO 
requirement and there is no sensitive list the South Asian countries are able to increase their 
exports within the region quite substantially. India appears to be the largest gainer from such 
scenario. However, Nepal also turns out to be important gainer as her exports to the South 
Asian region as whole increase by around US$ 90 million .  Interestingly almost all of hear 
export increase would be targeted to Indian market (99 percent) under such a scenario. The 
rise in exports from Nepal to India, because of this scenario, is much higher than those from 
Bhutan and Sri Lanka; because initial exports to India from Nepal (361 million) is much 
higher than those from Bhutan (88 million) and Sri Lanka (295 million). Also, because of the 
comprehensive India-Sri Lanka bilateral FTA, there is very little to gain for Sri Lanka, as far 
as exports to the Indian market is concerned, under such a full SAFTA scenario.      
 
Table 5: Increase in Exports and Imports among SAFTA countries (Thousand US$) 
(under full SAFTA with no ROO and no sensitive list) 
 
                     To 
From 
Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Total 
Exports 
Bangladesh  637.69 26043.61 7.65 918.84 4750.44 1198.28 33556.51 
Bhutan -  21693.89 - 113.13 84.88 0.01 21891.91 
India 350978.32 40408.25  31576.28 177182.61 196432.19 218727.26 1015305.01 
Maldives - - 858.52  - 58.81 2262.29 3179.62 
Nepal 22.08 247.99 89542.48 2.67  699.28 30.63 90545.13 
Pakistan 44637.39 - 60452.46 346.21 691.63  7822.05 113949.71 
Sri Lanka 4301.66 0.81 2946.48 16549.71 973.74 7040.32  31812.72 
Total Imports 399939.51 41294.74 201537.44 48482.52 179880.01 209065.91 230040.51  
Source: WITS/SMART simulation 
 
 
The WITS/SMART model also provides information on the sectoral increase in exports from 
Nepal under such a scenario at the six digit HS code classification. As 99 percent of the 
increase in exports from Nepal to the South Asian region is targeted only to India under such 
a scenario, in this paper we analyse the pattern of this rise in exports only in the Indian 
market. The analysis of the WITS/SMART simulation results suggest that a number of 539 
commodities (at the six digit HS code) are exported from Nepal to India. The detailed 
information on the increase in exports in the case of these 539 commodities is reported in 
Annex 1. However, Table 6 provides information for the top 100 export commodities. It is 
clearly evident from Table 6 that under simulation 1 the top 100 products will constitute more 
than 93 percent of the rise in exports to Indian market. 
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Table 6: Exports of top 100 products from Nepal to India (WITS/SMART simulation 1 results) 
 
HS Tariff Line Code at 6 digit level 
Export 
Before 
($ '000) 
Export 
After 
($ '000) 
Increase 
In Export 
($ '000) 
% rise in 
Exports 
90830 9,096.19 14,347.73 5,251.55 57.73 
220290 16,519.10 21,755.05 5,235.95 31.70 
721041 11,924.80 15,901.40 3,976.60 33.35 
90240 2,884.44 6,407.66 3,523.22 122.15 
392321 8,894.20 12,376.72 3,482.52 39.15 
390690 8,641.92 12,084.40 3,442.48 39.83 
721049 6,008.42 9,377.08 3,368.66 56.07 
550921 17,059.54 20,420.90 3,361.36 19.70 
291732 10,844.46 13,768.58 2,924.11 26.96 
230990 7,427.25 10,251.54 2,824.29 38.03 
730610 19,387.51 22,184.86 2,797.35 14.43 
600129 5,320.47 8,035.54 2,715.08 51.03 
381220 4,980.98 7,439.91 2,458.94 49.37 
721790 4,408.28 6,750.50 2,342.22 53.13 
90230 2,886.69 5,114.08 2,227.39 77.16 
760410 12,505.81 14,642.27 2,136.46 17.08 
71340 8,143.79 10,194.44 2,050.65 25.18 
380610 4,984.10 6,809.26 1,825.16 36.62 
91010 3,855.36 5,537.33 1,681.98 43.63 
392350 2,559.46 3,738.64 1,179.18 46.07 
210690 716.985 1,858.18 1,141.20 159.17 
441032 3,688.73 4,824.98 1,136.25 30.80 
391721 7,376.78 8,473.48 1,096.69 14.87 
190219 3,383.56 4,416.56 1,033.00 30.53 
392329 2,108.32 3,078.40 970.079 46.01 
721030 1,652.78 2,506.76 853.984 51.67 
320300 5,827.02 6,668.32 841.294 14.44 
121190 1,851.60 2,654.99 803.386 43.39 
551011 3,204.82 3,864.71 659.887 20.59 
392690 1,388.36 2,044.98 656.621 47.29 
531010 10,479.72 11,075.93 596.212 5.69 
40590 1,484.06 2,053.07 569.01 38.34 
392020 2,639.63 3,204.29 564.661 21.39 
410621 740.916 1,259.99 519.075 70.06 
600290 747.257 1,240.00 492.745 65.94 
410419 733.284 1,210.39 477.11 65.06 
741819 4,101.17 4,562.92 461.745 11.26 
841391 1,381.09 1,837.93 456.838 33.08 
640419 2,302.05 2,720.05 418.002 18.16 
251710 2,327.84 2,725.24 397.393 17.07 
392390 827.245 1,218.68 391.431 47.32 
391729 2,190.53 2,552.11 361.582 16.51 
230690 1,328.06 1,678.59 350.539 26.39 
720825 587.641 928.777 341.136 58.05 
560710 8,608.26 8,944.79 336.535 3.91 
230220 531.476 829.57 298.094 56.09 
540793 1,561.45 1,854.53 293.078 18.77 
540761 756.16 1,026.12 269.964 35.70 
550941 1,113.56 1,378.41 264.848 23.78 
761519 1,249.43 1,512.84 263.415 21.08 
540781 989.994 1,238.88 248.881 25.14 
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HS Tariff Line Code at 6 digit level 
Export 
Before 
($ '000) 
Export 
After 
($ '000) 
Increase 
In Export 
($ '000) 
% rise in 
Exports 
721720 448.145 694.09 245.945 54.88 
220300 197.466 442.351 244.885 124.01 
500790 658.349 898.944 240.595 36.55 
140490 727.114 961.716 234.602 32.26 
390610 524.198 741.205 217.007 41.40 
140300 869.977 1,086.15 216.177 24.85 
540239 1,074.06 1,283.34 209.281 19.49 
410449 314.447 518.971 204.524 65.04 
680221 528.487 722.408 193.921 36.69 
730690 818.688 1,012.48 193.789 23.67 
551319 631.422 823.247 191.825 30.38 
720421 322.272 509.968 187.696 58.24 
250590 1,133.02 1,319.51 186.491 16.46 
570330 517.363 701.657 184.294 35.62 
600110 266.459 447.984 181.525 68.12 
721070 310.995 491.487 180.492 58.04 
230230 650.506 821.639 171.133 26.31 
40690 242.307 411.177 168.87 69.69 
190230 326.597 491.762 165.165 50.57 
740929 532.757 688.183 155.426 29.17 
391723 1,012.38 1,166.12 153.743 15.19 
740919 462.744 615.883 153.139 33.09 
80290 284.074 436.405 152.331 53.62 
721710 262.345 409.144 146.799 55.96 
721069 252.257 398.337 146.08 57.91 
551449 819.665 964.617 144.952 17.68 
731100 830.643 969.46 138.817 16.71 
410799 213.063 350.922 137.859 64.70 
540810 1,041.80 1,174.21 132.409 12.71 
392010 598.614 730.047 131.433 21.96 
392330 276.019 407.125 131.106 47.50 
870210 340.148 469.319 129.171 37.97 
380510 358.514 487.26 128.746 35.91 
380590 435.865 559.703 123.838 28.41 
540710 338.325 459.7 121.375 35.88 
71390 274.219 389.863 115.644 42.17 
580632 606.375 718.614 112.239 18.51 
730519 606.719 716.631 109.912 18.12 
130190 249.46 358.156 108.696 43.57 
170310 808.076 916.357 108.281 13.40 
848180 193.932 302.105 108.173 55.78 
540269 693.098 800.606 107.508 15.51 
550942 369.736 476.043 106.307 28.75 
600390 154.717 257.996 103.279 66.75 
540730 1,033.52 1,136.18 102.665 9.93 
870899 199.132 300.41 101.278 50.86 
550931 418.686 518.643 99.957 23.87 
200980 159.979 252.071 92.092 57.57 
760429 226.841 302.791 75.95 33.48 
Total for top 100 products exported to India 270,828.10 354,695.35 83,867.25 30.97 
Total exports to India 303,275.03 392,817.51 89,542.48 29.53 
Share of top 100 products in total exports to India (%) 89.30 90.29 93.66  
Source: WITS/SMART simulation 
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WITS/SMART model also provides the estimates of trade creation and trade diversion effect. 
It appears that under scenario 1 (the full SAFTA scenario) Nepal’s trade creation effect will 
be equal to US$, 160821 thousand whereas the trade diversion effect will be a loss of US$, 
19454 thousand which would result in a net trade effect equal to US$ 141367 thousand.  It 
also appears from the simulation results that Nepal will face a loss in revenue equal to US$ 
90881 thousand. Finally, welfare gains for Nepal out of the full implementation of SAFTA 
(without any sensitive list or ROO restrictions) would be US$ 20486 thousand.   
 
 
5.3.2. Simulation 2: ROO restriction for Nepal under SAFTA and India-Nepal Trade 
Treaty 
 
As has been mentioned before, the value-addition criteria of the ROOs under SAFTA and the 
India-Nepal Trade Treaty are the same. In order to identify the sectors which can meet those 
ROO requirements we have used the sector specific value-added information calculated from 
the Social Accounting Matrix of Nepal for the year 2005 (Table 7). It appears from Table 7 
that a number of agro-processing and manufacturing products originating from Nepal can’t 
meet the 30 percent value-addition criteria. It is, however, important to note that some 
products (such as vegetable ghee and wearing apparel/ready made garments), which does not 
meet 30 percent value-addition criteria according to Table 8, are already being exported to 
India in a big way under preferential access. This may be because the value-addition 
calculated in the Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Nepal is different than those used under 
India-Nepal Trade Treaty. In the current exercise we have, therefore, dropped these two items 
from the ROO restriction list. 
 
Table 7: Percentage of Value addition in different Sectors in Nepal 
 
Sector 
Output 
(Million Nepali 
Rupee) 
Value Added 
(Million Nepali 
Rupee) 
Value-addition as 
% of output 
Paddy 34088 31561 93 
Wheat 10437 8842 85 
Other Grain 15935 15532 97 
Vegetables & Fruits 30758 29096 95 
Oilseed 3685 3254 88 
Sugar-cane 2460 2199 89 
Other Crops 19080 17461 92 
Jute and Other Plant Fibers 4038 315 8 
Tobacco 135 113 84 
Spices 4270 3010 71 
Cattle 13283 9402 71 
Other Animal Product 15324 2987 19 
Raw Milk 25264 15136 60 
Wool 571 73 13 
Timber Forest 11505 10957 95 
Non-Timber Forest 3681 3627 99 
Fishing 2321 1844 79 
Coal 4 4 88 
Other Mining 6871 1813 26 
Meat 57 15 26 
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Sector 
Output 
(Million Nepali 
Rupee) 
Value Added 
(Million Nepali 
Rupee) 
Value-addition as 
% of output 
Vegetable Oil 10657 2483 23 
Dairy Product 2880 561 19 
Other Grain Mill 9008 1082 12 
Sugar 2425 891 37 
Other Food Product 11783 1501 13 
Beverage 6278 2607 42 
Tobacco 1696 514 30 
Textile 22654 9501 42 
Wearing Apparel 25009 3008 12 
Leather Product 17378 591 3 
Lumber 2222 338 15 
Paper & Paper Product 14066 1758 12 
Chemical and Rubber 10261 5936 58 
Non-Metallic 9377 2852 30 
Iron & Steel 6824 531 8 
Non-Ferrous Metal 26040 616 2 
Fabricated Metal 14318 2624 18 
Motor-Vehicle 1042 23 2 
Electronic Equipment 1671 122 7 
Other Mech. & Equipment 1821 459 25 
Other Manufacturing.. 2850 395 14 
Source: The Social Accounting Matrix of Nepal 
Note: The sectors with value-addition lower than 30 percent are shown in shaded rows 
 
 
Using the information on value-addition, as contained in Table 7, it is possible to isolate the 
sectors in the WITS/SMART model for Nepal which fail to meet the 30 percent value-
addition criteria under both SAFTA and the India-Nepal Trade Treaty. Therefore, under such 
a scenario there will be no rise in export from these sectors. It appears from the simulation 
results that the number of such commodities would be 210. Annex 2 provides the list of these 
commodities with the information on increase in exports from these sectors if there were no 
such ROO restrictions. Table 8 presents the information on the aggregate of the rise in 
exports from the rest 293 commodities.  It appears that because of ROO (and assuming no 
sensitive list) 34 percent of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India would be 
unrealized.   
 
 
Table 8: Nepal’s Exports to India under Simulation 2 
 
 Export Before  
($ '000) 
Export After  
($ '000) 
Change In Export  
($ '000) 
Without any ROO and Sensitive list 303275.03 392817.51 89542.48 
The Commodities which can meet ROO requirement  200815.95 259909.21 59093.26 
Export Lost due to ROO (Commodities which can’t  
meet the ROO requirement) 
102459.08 132908.31 30449.22 
Share of Export lost due to ROO in total exports (of  
the scenario with no ROO and sensitive list)    
33.78% 33.83% 34.05% 
Source: WITS/SMART simulation 
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5.3.3. Simulation 3: Sensitive List restriction for Nepal under SAFTA 
 
As has been mentioned before, the SAFTA treaty allows India to have a negative list for 
LDCs on 744 commodities at the four digit HS code. It appears from the WITS/SMART 
simulation results that because of such a negative list, rise in exports from 127 commodities, 
at the six digit HS code, from Nepal to India will be restricted. A list of such commodities 
with the information on their potentials of export expansion (using the model simulation) is 
presented in Annex 3.  Table 9 presents the information on the aggregate of the rise in exports 
from the rest 389 commodities. It appears that because of sensitive list (and assuming no 
ROO) as high as 47 percent of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India would be 
unrealized.   
 
Table 9: Nepal’s Exports to India under Simulation 3 
 
 Export Before  
($ '000) 
Export After  
($ '000) 
Change In Export  
($ '000) 
Without any ROO and Sensitive list 303275.03 392817.51 89542.48 
The Commodities which are outside of sensitive list 198405.36 247828.57 49423.21 
Export Lost due to Sensitive list (Commodities which are  
included in the sensitive list) 
108728.92 150725.42 41996.51 
Share of Export lost due to Sensitive list in total exports (of  
the scenario with no ROO and sensitive list)    
35.85% 38.37% 46.91% 
Source: WITS/SMART simulation 
 
 
5.3.4. Simulation 4: ROO Restriction and Sensitive List Restriction under SAFTA for 
Nepal 
 
Simulation 2 and 3 indicate that substantial portion of the potential rise in exports from Nepal 
to India would be lost because of the presence of ROO and sensitive list. In those two 
simulations we have considered the impacts of ROO and sensitive list separately. However, 
in reality they are put in place simultaneously. Therefore, in the current simulation we have 
considered the presence of both ROO and sensitive list for Nepal under SAFTA. Table 10 
presents the simulation results. It appears that because of ROO and sensitive list more than 
two-third of the potential rise in exports from Nepal to India would be lost. 
 
 
Table 10: Nepal’s Exports to India under Simulation 4 
 
 Export Before  
($ '000) 
Export After  
($ '000) 
Change In 
Export  
($ '000) 
Without any ROO and Sensitive list 303275.03 392817.51 89542.48 
The Commodities which are outside of ROO and sensitive list 121501.04 148387.66 26886.62 
Export Lost due to ROO and Sensitive list  181773.99 244429.86 62655.87 
Share of Export lost due to ROO and Sensitive list    59.94% 62.22% 69.97% 
Source: WITS/SMART simulation 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Given the fact that value-additions of most of Nepal’s export products are very low, a 30 
percent value-addition requirement under SAFTA as well as under the India-Nepal Trade 
Treaty would act as a significant barrier for her export expansion in India. This is also true for 
other LDCs in South Asia. Therefore, the problem of ROO will need to be resolved, keeping 
an eye on the manufacturing/processing capability of the LDCs. In addition, the other criteria 
of the ROO, namely the change in tariff head, under SAFTA should also be made consistent 
with those that are currently in force in the bilateral trade agreements within the SAARC 
region, which happen to be more liberal than the prevailing SAFTA rules. For example, the 
Pakistan-Sri Lanka BFTA has a relatively flexible rule in this regard. Note that a free trade 
area (FTA) needs a strict system of proof of origin mainly for preventing trade deflection. 
Since trade deflections can occur only when there are wide differences in the members’ 
external tariffs, due importance should be given both to reduce the absolute levels of the 
members’ external tariffs and to narrow down the inter-country differences in tariff rates. 
Wide differences in the members’ external tariffs will make the ROO difficult to implement. 
 
It also appears that SAFTA sensitive list is too stringent to allow significant rise in exports 
from the LDCs (in this case Nepal) to the Indian market. In almost all the cases, the products, 
which are included in the sensitive list, have significantly high export potentials. It can thus 
be concluded that if these sensitive lists are not phased out, there will be very little to gain 
from SAFTA by Nepal and other LDCs in this region.   
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Annex 1: Change in Nepal’s Exports to India under Simulation 1 (Assuming no ROO and 
Sensitive List under SAFTA) 
 
Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
10290 0.898 1.29 0.392 43.65 
21019 20.477 29.14 8.663 42.31 
40590 1,484.06 2,053.07 569.01 38.34 
40610 84.168 129.497 45.329 53.86 
40690 242.307 411.177 168.87 69.69 
50210 4.46 7.187 2.727 61.14 
50290 4.302 6.911 2.609 60.65 
50610 15.298 20.084 4.786 31.29 
50690 45.941 64.108 18.167 39.54 
70320 34.553 41.464 6.911 20.00 
70420 34.344 37.514 3.17 9.23 
70490 127.144 138.88 11.736 9.23 
71290 101.519 160.885 59.366 58.48 
71331 35.523 49.772 14.249 40.11 
71339 20.613 28.641 8.028 38.95 
71340 8,143.79 10,194.44 2,050.65 25.18 
71390 274.219 389.863 115.644 42.17 
80290 284.074 436.405 152.331 53.62 
81090 23.65 27.515 3.865 16.34 
81290 2.64 4.02 1.38 52.27 
81340 0.262 0.408 0.146 55.73 
90210 92.58 145.406 52.826 57.06 
90220 26.964 61.72 34.756 128.90 
90230 2,886.69 5,114.08 2,227.39 77.16 
90240 2,884.44 6,407.66 3,523.22 122.15 
90610 130.531 200.313 69.782 53.46 
90830 9,096.19 14,347.73 5,251.55 57.73 
91010 3,855.36 5,537.33 1,681.98 43.63 
91030 5.102 7.81 2.708 53.08 
91040 181.4 236.008 54.608 30.10 
91099 28.689 39.717 11.028 38.44 
110100 14.558 23.21 8.652 59.43 
110430 15.529 19.663 4.134 26.62 
120400 355.776 388.617 32.841 9.23 
121130 5.049 5.876 0.827 16.38 
121190 1,851.60 2,654.99 803.386 43.39 
121299 41.083 48.538 7.455 18.15 
121300 508.012 554.905 46.893 9.23 
121490 0.556 0.607 0.051 9.17 
130190 249.46 358.156 108.696 43.57 
140110 0.17 0.245 0.075 44.12 
140190 153.585 204.757 51.172 33.32 
140300 869.977 1,086.15 216.177 24.85 
140410 15.884 24.303 8.419 53.00 
140490 727.114 961.716 234.602 32.26 
150990 32.935 46.757 13.822 41.97 
160250 27.212 31.258 4.046 14.87 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
170230 39.232 48.124 8.892 22.67 
170240 203.282 255.571 52.289 25.72 
170310 808.076 916.357 108.281 13.40 
170390 130.535 175.837 45.302 34.70 
170490 0.65 0.873 0.223 34.31 
190211 26.203 42.055 15.852 60.50 
190219 3,383.56 4,416.56 1,033.00 30.53 
190230 326.597 491.762 165.165 50.57 
190240 48.09 72.493 24.403 50.74 
190410 23.958 38.732 14.774 61.67 
190590 455.998 455.504 -0.494 -0.11 
200290 5.565 7.548 1.983 35.63 
200710 205.781 253.096 47.315 22.99 
200799 35.763 45.132 9.369 26.20 
200919 32.192 41.939 9.747 30.28 
200949 4.66 6.204 1.544 33.13 
200980 159.979 252.071 92.092 57.57 
200990 73.604 110.909 37.305 50.68 
210690 716.985 1,858.18 1,141.20 159.17 
220210 4.66 5.479 0.819 17.58 
220290 16,519.10 21,755.05 5,235.95 31.70 
220300 197.466 442.351 244.885 124.01 
220890 4.898 13.257 8.359 170.66 
230220 531.476 829.57 298.094 56.09 
230230 650.506 821.639 171.133 26.31 
230240 141.315 178.492 37.177 26.31 
230250 260.443 329.957 69.514 26.69 
230400 45.011 69.174 24.163 53.68 
230500 26.201 33.094 6.893 26.31 
230610 11.864 14.985 3.121 26.31 
230620 17.177 21.696 4.519 26.31 
230630 32.466 41.007 8.541 26.31 
230650 26.208 42.64 16.432 62.70 
230690 1,328.06 1,678.59 350.539 26.39 
230990 7,427.25 10,251.54 2,824.29 38.03 
250590 1,133.02 1,319.51 186.491 16.46 
250810 2.915 3.944 1.029 35.30 
250850 18.186 24.608 6.422 35.31 
251511 9.643 13.05 3.407 35.33 
251512 61.157 82.732 21.575 35.28 
251690 22.873 29.757 6.884 30.10 
251710 2,327.84 2,725.24 397.393 17.07 
251990 11.338 15.345 4.007 35.34 
281700 2.933 4.036 1.103 37.61 
284020 6.149 8.442 2.293 37.29 
290290 0.587 0.806 0.219 37.31 
290312 6.778 9.309 2.531 37.34 
290511 5.951 8.394 2.443 41.05 
291539 1.281 1.807 0.526 41.06 
291732 10,844.46 13,768.58 2,924.11 26.96 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
300390 3,618.65 3,617.63 -1.024 -0.03 
300490 1,502.23 1,502.23 0 0.00 
320190 8.299 10.094 1.795 21.63 
320300 5,827.02 6,668.32 841.294 14.44 
320413 37.711 45.841 8.13 21.56 
321000 0.443 0.521 0.078 17.61 
321590 3.052 4.163 1.111 36.40 
330119 13.468 18.814 5.346 39.69 
330125 15.969 22.113 6.144 38.47 
330129 80.025 111.889 31.864 39.82 
330130 17.941 25.072 7.131 39.75 
330190 48.988 68.508 19.52 39.85 
330300 20.885 24.542 3.657 17.51 
330510 2.496 2.496 0 0.00 
330741 24.021 28.194 4.173 17.37 
340119 1,486.05 1,477.54 -8.513 -0.57 
340120 26.532 26.503 -0.029 -0.11 
350190 11.841 15.726 3.885 32.81 
350400 27.246 36.291 9.045 33.20 
380110 11.289 15.92 4.631 41.02 
380300 27.728 38.545 10.817 39.01 
380510 358.514 487.26 128.746 35.91 
380590 435.865 559.703 123.838 28.41 
380610 4,984.10 6,809.26 1,825.16 36.62 
380620 18.036 25.36 7.324 40.61 
380690 163.794 230.214 66.42 40.55 
380993 6.889 9.72 2.831 41.09 
381220 4,980.98 7,439.91 2,458.94 49.37 
382200 16.741 26.149 9.408 56.20 
382313 22.346 38.582 16.236 72.66 
382440 72.237 112.675 40.438 55.98 
390421 72.564 103.221 30.657 42.25 
390422 14.295 20.335 6.04 42.25 
390599 22.013 31.31 9.297 42.23 
390610 524.198 741.205 217.007 41.40 
390690 8,641.92 12,084.40 3,442.48 39.83 
390720 65.827 95.436 29.609 44.98 
390791 9.719 14.092 4.373 44.99 
391290 174.211 245.34 71.129 40.83 
391310 2.748 3.876 1.128 41.05 
391530 19.695 24.056 4.361 22.14 
391590 26.282 32.569 6.287 23.92 
391710 239.808 283.924 44.116 18.40 
391721 7,376.78 8,473.48 1,096.69 14.87 
391722 7.728 9.112 1.384 17.91 
391723 1,012.38 1,166.12 153.743 15.19 
391729 2,190.53 2,552.11 361.582 16.51 
391731 386.97 453.856 66.886 17.28 
391732 13.558 16.57 3.012 22.22 
391739 12.082 14.769 2.687 22.24 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
391740 76.195 112.505 36.31 47.65 
391810 19.501 23.798 4.297 22.03 
391910 185.471 226.304 40.833 22.02 
391990 77.922 95.305 17.383 22.31 
392010 598.614 730.047 131.433 21.96 
392020 2,639.63 3,204.29 564.661 21.39 
392030 35.386 43.171 7.785 22.00 
392049 79.762 97.493 17.731 22.23 
392059 7.588 9.275 1.687 22.23 
392069 49.745 61.558 11.813 23.75 
392071 13.046 15.855 2.809 21.53 
392073 21.223 25.609 4.386 20.67 
392099 158.863 196.484 37.621 23.68 
392111 9.197 11.232 2.035 22.13 
392112 47.425 57.885 10.46 22.06 
392113 39.387 48.7 9.313 23.64 
392119 62.281 76.051 13.77 22.11 
392190 180.367 223.16 42.793 23.73 
392310 58.849 86.809 27.96 47.51 
392321 8,894.20 12,376.72 3,482.52 39.15 
392329 2,108.32 3,078.40 970.079 46.01 
392330 276.019 407.125 131.106 47.50 
392350 2,559.46 3,738.64 1,179.18 46.07 
392390 827.245 1,218.68 391.431 47.32 
392410 6.912 9.599 2.687 38.87 
392490 1.735 2.569 0.834 48.07 
392510 31.53 46.539 15.009 47.60 
392610 1.812 2.682 0.87 48.01 
392620 9.574 14.059 4.485 46.85 
392630 6.262 9.255 2.993 47.80 
392640 15.742 23.246 7.504 47.67 
392690 1,388.36 2,044.98 656.621 47.29 
400510 69.329 137.081 67.752 97.73 
400922 0.317 0.482 0.165 52.05 
401390 12.922 25.511 12.589 97.42 
401610 51.079 99.525 48.446 94.85 
401691 3.849 5.793 1.944 50.51 
401693 4.351 6.557 2.206 50.70 
401699 147.464 222.221 74.757 50.70 
401700 19.778 39.1 19.322 97.69 
410411 25.562 42.178 16.616 65.00 
410419 733.284 1,210.39 477.11 65.06 
410449 314.447 518.971 204.524 65.04 
410621 740.916 1,259.99 519.075 70.06 
410640 101.502 154.867 53.365 52.58 
410691 26.366 45.265 18.899 71.68 
410692 25.398 43.465 18.067 71.14 
410711 37.509 61.272 23.763 63.35 
410799 213.063 350.922 137.859 64.70 
411520 44.212 75.735 31.523 71.30 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
420221 1.095 1.312 0.217 19.82 
420229 2.222 2.906 0.684 30.78 
440130 1.192 1.283 0.091 7.63 
440920 5.23 6.36 1.13 21.61 
441031 113.228 161.669 48.441 42.78 
441032 3,688.73 4,824.98 1,136.25 30.80 
441299 0.261 0.32 0.059 22.61 
441510 0.1 0.12 0.02 20.00 
441520 2.74 3.284 0.544 19.85 
441600 0.935 1.121 0.186 19.89 
441700 3.69 4.419 0.729 19.76 
441820 0.256 0.307 0.051 19.92 
442090 0.666 0.952 0.286 42.94 
442190 7.883 10.864 2.981 37.82 
450190 0.528 0.728 0.2 37.88 
460210 87.322 111.276 23.954 27.43 
460290 2.018 2.774 0.756 37.46 
470100 1.112 1.266 0.154 13.85 
470710 0.048 0.066 0.018 37.50 
470790 3.728 5.138 1.41 37.82 
480210 33.853 39.246 5.393 15.93 
480220 409.823 468.431 58.608 14.30 
480230 6.596 7.653 1.057 16.02 
480254 20.315 23.575 3.26 16.05 
480261 13.207 15.333 2.126 16.10 
480262 6.611 7.645 1.034 15.64 
480269 343.967 393.795 49.828 14.49 
480820 333.985 378.063 44.078 13.20 
480890 497.465 568.191 70.726 14.22 
481013 6.408 7.682 1.274 19.88 
481029 5.898 7.059 1.161 19.68 
481039 0.208 0.249 0.041 19.71 
481910 38.785 46.5 7.715 19.89 
482020 156.384 188.68 32.296 20.65 
482090 16.344 22.46 6.116 37.42 
482110 7.928 10.874 2.946 37.16 
490110 35.021 42.05 7.029 20.07 
490199 15.229 18.285 3.056 20.07 
490900 0.305 0.42 0.115 37.70 
500310 4.972 6.61 1.638 32.94 
500390 40.434 54.551 14.117 34.91 
500400 35.815 48.933 13.118 36.63 
500710 26.513 36.42 9.907 37.37 
500720 34.043 46.501 12.458 36.59 
500790 658.349 898.944 240.595 36.55 
510119 4.512 5.629 1.117 24.76 
510310 11.215 15.101 3.886 34.65 
510320 12.73 17.324 4.594 36.09 
510330 9.392 12.208 2.816 29.98 
510710 0.582 0.795 0.213 36.60 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
520299 164.918 180.535 15.617 9.47 
520511 29.284 32.316 3.032 10.35 
520790 4.107 4.618 0.511 12.44 
530310 3.872 3.631 -0.241 -6.22 
530710 136.819 132.028 -4.791 -3.50 
530720 18.173 18.022 -0.151 -0.83 
530890 4.148 4.938 0.79 19.05 
531010 10,479.72 11,075.93 596.212 5.69 
531090 140.378 157.95 17.572 12.52 
531100 339.908 401.955 62.047 18.25 
540210 37.457 45.083 7.626 20.36 
540232 53.832 64.509 10.677 19.83 
540233 240.25 289.164 48.914 20.36 
540239 1,074.06 1,283.34 209.281 19.49 
540243 58.279 70.144 11.865 20.36 
540249 356.102 425.321 69.219 19.44 
540269 693.098 800.606 107.508 15.51 
540310 103.22 122.698 19.478 18.87 
540342 33.767 40.62 6.853 20.29 
540710 338.325 459.7 121.375 35.88 
540720 485.45 552.891 67.441 13.89 
540730 1,033.52 1,136.18 102.665 9.93 
540751 235.694 303.522 67.828 28.78 
540752 25.817 35.243 9.426 36.51 
540761 756.16 1,026.12 269.964 35.70 
540769 50.469 68.878 18.409 36.48 
540781 989.994 1,238.88 248.881 25.14 
540783 87.527 110.816 23.289 26.61 
540784 25.954 34.581 8.627 33.24 
540793 1,561.45 1,854.53 293.078 18.77 
540810 1,041.80 1,174.21 132.409 12.71 
550510 24.593 34.675 10.082 41.00 
550620 16.692 23.548 6.856 41.07 
550921 17,059.54 20,420.90 3,361.36 19.70 
550931 418.686 518.643 99.957 23.87 
550941 1,113.56 1,378.41 264.848 23.78 
550942 369.736 476.043 106.307 28.75 
550951 197.235 269.208 71.973 36.49 
550953 29.836 40.919 11.083 37.15 
550959 14.44 19.664 5.224 36.18 
550969 47.931 65.604 17.673 36.87 
550999 126.606 175.387 48.781 38.53 
551011 3,204.82 3,864.71 659.887 20.59 
551012 26.444 36.404 9.96 37.66 
551020 14.432 17.199 2.767 19.17 
551090 16.432 22.739 6.307 38.38 
551110 11.794 16.378 4.584 38.87 
551130 216.617 258.282 41.665 19.23 
551299 39.558 52.626 13.068 33.04 
551311 129.579 165.101 35.522 27.41 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
551319 631.422 823.247 191.825 30.38 
551349 38.273 52.027 13.754 35.94 
551449 819.665 964.617 144.952 17.68 
551511 92.899 126.217 33.318 35.86 
551614 109.819 148.435 38.616 35.16 
560410 127.35 189.912 62.562 49.13 
560710 8,608.26 8,944.79 336.535 3.91 
560729 7.884 9.248 1.364 17.30 
560819 6.373 7.585 1.212 19.02 
570190 0.579 0.79 0.211 36.44 
570231 5.602 7.639 2.037 36.36 
570242 6.13 8.366 2.236 36.48 
570330 517.363 701.657 184.294 35.62 
570500 5.672 7.718 2.046 36.07 
580410 9.992 13.622 3.63 36.33 
580500 2.822 3.36 0.538 19.06 
580620 8.762 10.253 1.491 17.02 
580631 95.485 113.213 17.728 18.57 
580632 606.375 718.614 112.239 18.51 
580710 38.996 46.523 7.527 19.30 
580890 56.698 67.46 10.762 18.98 
600110 266.459 447.984 181.525 68.12 
600129 5,320.47 8,035.54 2,715.08 51.03 
600199 41.471 69.74 28.269 68.17 
600240 83.522 137.931 54.409 65.14 
600290 747.257 1,240.00 492.745 65.94 
600390 154.717 257.996 103.279 66.75 
600634 39.289 64.118 24.829 63.20 
630120 0.738 0.973 0.235 31.84 
630190 3.463 4.115 0.652 18.83 
630492 38.123 44.635 6.512 17.08 
630510 1,222.11 1,186.58 -35.526 -2.91 
630900 5.593 6.679 1.086 19.42 
640110 36.628 48.13 11.502 31.40 
640191 11.392 15.01 3.618 31.76 
640199 48.357 63.824 15.467 31.99 
640219 3.056 3.677 0.621 20.32 
640299 25.874 34.183 8.309 32.11 
640320 9.23 12.183 2.953 31.99 
640411 172.971 227.895 54.924 31.75 
640419 2,302.05 2,720.05 418.002 18.16 
640520 0.969 1.279 0.31 31.99 
640590 0.419 0.506 0.087 20.76 
640610 16.649 23.759 7.11 42.71 
640620 138.368 197.435 59.067 42.69 
680221 528.487 722.408 193.921 36.69 
680229 8.881 12.067 3.186 35.87 
680291 8.923 12.199 3.276 36.71 
680299 11.614 15.827 4.213 36.28 
681599 2.089 2.857 0.768 36.76 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
690220 11.897 14.43 2.533 21.29 
691110 2.155 2.631 0.476 22.09 
691200 1.882 2.53 0.648 34.43 
691490 5.012 7.127 2.115 42.20 
700100 22.111 30.176 8.065 36.48 
700239 6.867 9.39 2.523 36.74 
700330 7.775 10.557 2.782 35.78 
701090 15.988 21.864 5.876 36.75 
701329 28.465 38.91 10.445 36.69 
701399 2.267 3.1 0.833 36.74 
701720 2.267 3.182 0.915 40.36 
701790 4.557 6.399 1.842 40.42 
701990 2.041 2.791 0.75 36.75 
702000 19.074 26.774 7.7 40.37 
710310 6.056 9.848 3.792 62.62 
710399 4.677 7.604 2.927 62.58 
710700 63.567 81.786 18.219 28.66 
720410 4.787 7.579 2.792 58.32 
720421 322.272 509.968 187.696 58.24 
720430 2.461 3.896 1.435 58.31 
720449 2.218 3.512 1.294 58.34 
720510 21.222 32.181 10.959 51.64 
720719 8.157 12.863 4.706 57.69 
720720 118.695 187.665 68.97 58.11 
720825 587.641 928.777 341.136 58.05 
720915 88.253 139.446 51.193 58.01 
720918 87.064 137.726 50.662 58.19 
721011 24.06 38.083 14.023 58.28 
721030 1,652.78 2,506.76 853.984 51.67 
721041 11,924.80 15,901.40 3,976.60 33.35 
721049 6,008.42 9,377.08 3,368.66 56.07 
721069 252.257 398.337 146.08 57.91 
721070 310.995 491.487 180.492 58.04 
721090 56.568 89.553 32.985 58.31 
721190 87.503 138.356 50.853 58.12 
721710 262.345 409.144 146.799 55.96 
721720 448.145 694.09 245.945 54.88 
721790 4,408.28 6,750.50 2,342.22 53.13 
730300 38.816 48.099 9.283 23.92 
730410 29.281 36.328 7.047 24.07 
730490 74.049 91.863 17.814 24.06 
730511 53.731 66.656 12.925 24.06 
730519 606.719 716.631 109.912 18.12 
730610 19,387.51 22,184.86 2,797.35 14.43 
730690 818.688 1,012.48 193.789 23.67 
730793 10.02 12.094 2.074 20.70 
730799 9.589 11.575 1.986 20.71 
730820 226.923 264.387 37.464 16.51 
730890 32.068 37.475 5.407 16.86 
730900 2.672 3.128 0.456 17.07 
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Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
731010 51.392 61.887 10.495 20.42 
731029 28.895 34.832 5.937 20.55 
731100 830.643 969.46 138.817 16.71 
731210 212.33 262.884 50.554 23.81 
731300 94.787 116.124 21.337 22.51 
731414 8.132 10.084 1.952 24.00 
731420 116.619 144.298 27.679 23.73 
731441 26.455 32.07 5.615 21.22 
731449 153.447 185.133 31.686 20.65 
731700 37.726 46.697 8.971 23.78 
732111 15.454 17.898 2.444 15.81 
732190 9.724 11.263 1.539 15.83 
732394 25.074 28.807 3.733 14.89 
732399 0.269 0.31 0.041 15.24 
732690 5.963 6.993 1.03 17.27 
740322 5.141 6.882 1.741 33.87 
740400 87.253 100.411 13.158 15.08 
740721 125.721 168.214 42.493 33.80 
740811 200.989 200.042 -0.947 -0.47 
740819 91.188 90.049 -1.139 -1.25 
740821 149.331 199.52 50.189 33.61 
740911 65.109 87.08 21.971 33.74 
740919 462.744 615.883 153.139 33.09 
740929 532.757 688.183 155.426 29.17 
741300 1.646 2.4 0.754 45.81 
741819 4,101.17 4,562.92 461.745 11.26 
741999 105.86 140.06 34.2 32.31 
760200 145.658 197.043 51.385 35.28 
760410 12,505.81 14,642.27 2,136.46 17.08 
760421 176.156 232.431 56.275 31.95 
760429 226.841 302.791 75.95 33.48 
760611 82.994 111.081 28.087 33.84 
760691 24.271 32.495 8.224 33.88 
761210 12.221 16.987 4.766 39.00 
761300 20.199 26.776 6.577 32.56 
761519 1,249.43 1,512.84 263.415 21.08 
761520 51.566 66.073 14.507 28.13 
761699 20.129 26.687 6.558 32.58 
800300 150.246 198.486 48.24 32.11 
821300 0.573 0.967 0.394 68.76 
830210 137.281 187.249 49.968 36.40 
830230 83.047 113.396 30.349 36.54 
830621 0.224 0.262 0.038 16.96 
830790 4.764 5.598 0.834 17.51 
831110 8.366 9.826 1.46 17.45 
831120 2.824 3.316 0.492 17.42 
840710 118.673 175.459 56.786 47.85 
840999 0.317 0.467 0.15 47.32 
841221 4.439 5.915 1.476 33.25 
841319 5.429 7.234 1.805 33.25 
 37
Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
841320 53.136 70.194 17.058 32.10 
841330 79.703 106.179 26.476 33.22 
841391 1,381.09 1,837.93 456.838 33.08 
841919 14.604 19.336 4.732 32.40 
842240 28.664 38.194 9.53 33.25 
842890 143.435 191.584 48.149 33.57 
842940 9.297 12.371 3.074 33.06 
843510 19.067 25.378 6.311 33.10 
843780 6.925 9.234 2.309 33.34 
843890 5.586 6.56 0.974 17.44 
844390 0.616 0.821 0.205 33.28 
844720 75.797 100.962 25.165 33.20 
844819 0.163 0.217 0.054 33.13 
845510 141.884 198.825 56.941 40.13 
845590 2.257 3.17 0.913 40.45 
847420 1.49 1.755 0.265 17.79 
847439 1.417 1.888 0.471 33.24 
847989 1.765 2.352 0.587 33.26 
848079 22.3 35.965 13.665 61.28 
848110 0.113 0.182 0.069 61.06 
848180 193.932 302.105 108.173 55.78 
848210 2.504 3.26 0.756 30.19 
848291 1.542 2.055 0.513 33.27 
848299 2.183 2.842 0.659 30.19 
848340 0.78 1.258 0.478 61.28 
848590 4.082 6.585 2.503 61.32 
850110 1.346 1.58 0.234 17.38 
850133 7.37 8.634 1.264 17.15 
850153 4.252 4.981 0.729 17.14 
850410 5.783 6.584 0.801 13.85 
850710 67.01 83.101 16.091 24.01 
850780 49.299 63.942 14.643 29.70 
850790 264.462 304.696 40.234 15.21 
851629 0.113 0.131 0.018 15.93 
853990 14.739 20.027 5.288 35.88 
854411 3,968.89 3,965.50 -3.387 -0.09 
854890 5.159 6.318 1.159 22.47 
870190 162.196 225.116 62.92 38.79 
870210 340.148 469.319 129.171 37.97 
870321 2.463 7.261 4.798 194.80 
870590 60.38 84.44 24.06 39.85 
870840 7.631 11.164 3.533 46.30 
870899 199.132 300.41 101.278 50.86 
871690 10.477 15.735 5.258 50.19 
880390 0.519 1.027 0.508 97.88 
903039 1.387 1.71 0.323 23.29 
903180 3.858 4.764 0.906 23.48 
940330 1.185 1.185 0 0.00 
940360 0.979 0.978 -0.001 -0.10 
940370 179.401 178.244 -1.157 -0.64 
 38
Tariff Line  
Code 
Export  
Before ($ '000) 
Export  
After ($ '000) 
Change In  
Export ($ '000) % change in Exports 
960190 3.693 5.025 1.332 36.07 
960200 0.401 0.547 0.146 36.41 
960711 14.513 15.967 1.454 10.02 
970110 86.539 114.479 27.94 32.29 
970190 161.623 222.178 60.555 37.47 
970300 121.035 155.797 34.762 28.72 
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Annex 2: The Commodities for which Export Expansion from Nepal to India is  
Restricted because of SAFTA ROO 
 
Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change in 
Exports 
021019 20.477 29.14 8.663 42.31 
040590 1,484.06 2,053.07 569.01 38.34 
040610 84.168 129.497 45.329 53.86 
040690 242.307 411.177 168.87 69.69 
050210 4.46 7.187 2.727 61.14 
050290 4.302 6.911 2.609 60.65 
050610 15.298 20.084 4.786 31.29 
050690 45.941 64.108 18.167 39.54 
150990 32.935 46.757 13.822 41.97 
190211 26.203 42.055 15.852 50.57 
190219 3,383.56 4,416.56 1,033.00 50.74 
190230 326.597 491.762 165.165 61.67 
190240 48.09 72.493 24.403 -0.11 
190410 23.958 38.732 14.774 35.63 
190590 455.998 455.504 -0.494 22.99 
200290 5.565 7.548 1.983 26.20 
200710 205.781 253.096 47.315 30.28 
200799 35.763 45.132 9.369 33.13 
200919 32.192 41.939 9.747 57.57 
200949 4.66 6.204 1.544 50.68 
200980 159.979 252.071 92.092 159.17 
200990 73.604 110.909 37.305 65.00 
210690 716.985 1,858.18 1,141.20 65.06 
410411 25.562 42.178 16.616 65.04 
410419 733.284 1,210.39 477.11 70.06 
410449 314.447 518.971 204.524 52.58 
410621 740.916 1,259.99 519.075 71.68 
410640 101.502 154.867 53.365 71.14 
410691 26.366 45.265 18.899 63.35 
410692 25.398 43.465 18.067 64.70 
410711 37.509 61.272 23.763 71.30 
410799 213.063 350.922 137.859 19.82 
411520 44.212 75.735 31.523 7.63 
420221 1.095 1.312 0.217 21.61 
440130 1.192 1.283 0.091 42.78 
440920 5.23 6.36 1.13 30.80 
441031 113.228 161.669 48.441 22.61 
441032 3,688.73 4,824.98 1,136.25 20.00 
441299 0.261 0.32 0.059 19.85 
441510 0.1 0.12 0.02 19.89 
441520 2.74 3.284 0.544 19.76 
441600 0.935 1.121 0.186 19.92 
441700 3.69 4.419 0.729 42.94 
441820 0.256 0.307 0.051 37.82 
442090 0.666 0.952 0.286 37.88 
442190 7.883 10.864 2.981 27.43 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change in 
Exports 
450190 0.528 0.728 0.2 37.46 
460210 87.322 111.276 23.954 13.85 
460290 2.018 2.774 0.756 37.50 
470100 1.112 1.266 0.154 37.82 
470710 0.048 0.066 0.018 15.93 
470790 3.728 5.138 1.41 14.30 
480210 33.853 39.246 5.393 16.02 
480220 409.823 468.431 58.608 16.05 
480230 6.596 7.653 1.057 16.10 
480254 20.315 23.575 3.26 15.64 
480261 13.207 15.333 2.126 14.49 
480262 6.611 7.645 1.034 13.20 
480269 343.967 393.795 49.828 14.22 
480820 333.985 378.063 44.078 19.88 
480890 497.465 568.191 70.726 19.68 
481013 6.408 7.682 1.274 19.71 
481029 5.898 7.059 1.161 19.89 
481039 0.208 0.249 0.041 20.65 
481910 38.785 46.5 7.715 37.42 
482020 156.384 188.68 32.296 37.16 
482090 16.344 22.46 6.116 20.07 
482110 7.928 10.874 2.946 20.07 
490110 35.021 42.05 7.029 37.70 
490199 15.229 18.285 3.056 24.76 
490900 0.305 0.42 0.115 34.65 
510119 4.512 5.629 1.117 36.09 
510310 11.215 15.101 3.886 29.98 
510320 12.73 17.324 4.594 36.60 
510330 9.392 12.208 2.816 -6.22 
510710 0.582 0.795 0.213 68.12 
530310 3.872 3.631 -0.241 51.03 
600110 266.459 447.984 181.525 68.17 
600129 5,320.47 8,035.54 2,715.08 65.14 
600199 41.471 69.74 28.269 65.94 
600240 83.522 137.931 54.409 66.75 
600290 747.257 1,240.00 492.745 63.20 
600390 154.717 257.996 103.279 31.84 
600634 39.289 64.118 24.829 18.83 
630120 0.738 0.973 0.235 17.08 
630190 3.463 4.115 0.652 -2.91 
630492 38.123 44.635 6.512 19.42 
630510 1,222.11 1,186.58 -35.526 31.40 
630900 5.593 6.679 1.086 31.76 
640110 36.628 48.13 11.502 31.99 
640191 11.392 15.01 3.618 20.32 
640199 48.357 63.824 15.467 32.11 
640219 3.056 3.677 0.621 31.99 
640299 25.874 34.183 8.309 31.75 
640320 9.23 12.183 2.953 18.16 
640411 172.971 227.895 54.924 31.99 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change in 
Exports 
640419 2,302.05 2,720.05 418.002 20.76 
640520 0.969 1.279 0.31 42.71 
640590 0.419 0.506 0.087 42.69 
640610 16.649 23.759 7.11 58.32 
640620 138.368 197.435 59.067 58.24 
720410 4.787 7.579 2.792 58.31 
720421 322.272 509.968 187.696 58.34 
720430 2.461 3.896 1.435 51.64 
720449 2.218 3.512 1.294 57.69 
720510 21.222 32.181 10.959 58.11 
720719 8.157 12.863 4.706 58.05 
720720 118.695 187.665 68.97 58.01 
720825 587.641 928.777 341.136 58.19 
720915 88.253 139.446 51.193 58.28 
720918 87.064 137.726 50.662 51.67 
721011 24.06 38.083 14.023 33.35 
721030 1,652.78 2,506.76 853.984 56.07 
721041 11,924.80 15,901.40 3,976.60 57.91 
721049 6,008.42 9,377.08 3,368.66 58.04 
721069 252.257 398.337 146.08 58.31 
721070 310.995 491.487 180.492 58.12 
721090 56.568 89.553 32.985 55.96 
721190 87.503 138.356 50.853 54.88 
721710 262.345 409.144 146.799 53.13 
721720 448.145 694.09 245.945 23.92 
721790 4,408.28 6,750.50 2,342.22 24.07 
730300 38.816 48.099 9.283 24.06 
730410 29.281 36.328 7.047 24.06 
730490 74.049 91.863 17.814 18.12 
730511 53.731 66.656 12.925 14.43 
730519 606.719 716.631 109.912 23.67 
730610 19,387.51 22,184.86 2,797.35 20.70 
730690 818.688 1,012.48 193.789 20.71 
730793 10.02 12.094 2.074 16.51 
730799 9.589 11.575 1.986 16.86 
730820 226.923 264.387 37.464 17.07 
730890 32.068 37.475 5.407 20.42 
730900 2.672 3.128 0.456 20.55 
731010 51.392 61.887 10.495 16.71 
731029 28.895 34.832 5.937 23.81 
731100 830.643 969.46 138.817 22.51 
731210 212.33 262.884 50.554 24.00 
731300 94.787 116.124 21.337 23.73 
731414 8.132 10.084 1.952 21.22 
731420 116.619 144.298 27.679 20.65 
731441 26.455 32.07 5.615 23.78 
731449 153.447 185.133 31.686 15.81 
731700 37.726 46.697 8.971 15.83 
732111 15.454 17.898 2.444 14.89 
732190 9.724 11.263 1.539 15.24 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change in 
Exports 
732394 25.074 28.807 3.733 17.27 
732399 0.269 0.31 0.041 33.87 
732690 5.963 6.993 1.03 15.08 
740322 5.141 6.882 1.741 33.80 
740400 87.253 100.411 13.158 -0.47 
740721 125.721 168.214 42.493 -1.25 
740811 200.989 200.042 -0.947 33.61 
740819 91.188 90.049 -1.139 33.74 
740821 149.331 199.52 50.189 33.09 
740911 65.109 87.08 21.971 29.17 
740919 462.744 615.883 153.139 45.81 
740929 532.757 688.183 155.426 11.26 
741300 1.646 2.4 0.754 32.31 
741819 4,101.17 4,562.92 461.745 35.28 
741999 105.86 140.06 34.2 17.08 
760200 145.658 197.043 51.385 31.95 
760410 12,505.81 14,642.27 2,136.46 33.48 
760421 176.156 232.431 56.275 33.84 
760429 226.841 302.791 75.95 33.88 
760611 82.994 111.081 28.087 39.00 
760691 24.271 32.495 8.224 32.56 
761210 12.221 16.987 4.766 21.08 
761300 20.199 26.776 6.577 28.13 
761519 1,249.43 1,512.84 263.415 32.58 
761520 51.566 66.073 14.507 32.11 
761699 20.129 26.687 6.558 68.76 
800300 150.246 198.486 48.24 36.40 
821300 0.573 0.967 0.394 36.54 
830210 137.281 187.249 49.968 16.96 
830230 83.047 113.396 30.349 17.51 
830621 0.224 0.262 0.038 17.45 
830790 4.764 5.598 0.834 17.42 
831110 8.366 9.826 1.46 17.38 
831120 2.824 3.316 0.492 17.15 
850110 1.346 1.58 0.234 17.14 
850133 7.37 8.634 1.264 13.85 
850153 4.252 4.981 0.729 24.01 
850410 5.783 6.584 0.801 29.70 
850710 67.01 83.101 16.091 15.21 
850780 49.299 63.942 14.643 15.93 
850790 264.462 304.696 40.234 35.88 
851629 0.113 0.131 0.018 -0.09 
853990 14.739 20.027 5.288 22.47 
854411 3,968.89 3,965.50 -3.387 38.79 
854890 5.159 6.318 1.159 37.97 
870190 162.196 225.116 62.92 194.80 
870210 340.148 469.319 129.171 39.85 
870321 2.463 7.261 4.798 46.30 
870590 60.38 84.44 24.06 50.86 
870840 7.631 11.164 3.533 50.19 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change in 
Exports 
870899 199.132 300.41 101.278 97.88 
871690 10.477 15.735 5.258 23.29 
880390 0.519 1.027 0.508 23.48 
903039 1.387 1.71 0.323 0.00 
903180 3.858 4.764 0.906 -0.10 
940330 1.185 1.185 0 -0.64 
940360 0.979 0.978 -0.001 36.07 
940370 179.401 178.244 -1.157 36.41 
960190 3.693 5.025 1.332 10.02 
960200 0.401 0.547 0.146 32.29 
960711 14.513 15.967 1.454 37.47 
970110 86.539 114.479 27.94 28.72 
970190 161.623 222.178 60.555 42.31 
970300 121.035 155.797 34.762 38.34 
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Annex 3: The Commodities for which Export expansion from Nepal to India is 
Restricted because of Sensitive List in SAFTA 
 
Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change  
in Export 
040590 1,484.06 2,053.07 569.01 38.34 
070320 34.553 41.464 6.911 20.00 
070420 34.344 37.514 3.17 9.23 
070490 127.144 138.88 11.736 9.23 
071290 101.519 160.885 59.366 58.48 
071331 35.523 49.772 14.249 40.11 
071339 20.613 28.641 8.028 38.95 
071340 8,143.79 10,194.44 2,050.65 25.18 
071390 274.219 389.863 115.644 42.17 
080290 284.074 436.405 152.331 53.62 
081290 2.64 4.02 1.38 52.27 
081340 0.262 0.408 0.146 55.73 
090210 92.58 145.406 52.826 57.06 
090220 26.964 61.72 34.756 128.90 
090230 2,886.69 5,114.08 2,227.39 77.16 
090240 2,884.44 6,407.66 3,523.22 122.15 
090610 130.531 200.313 69.782 53.46 
090830 9,096.19 14,347.73 5,251.55 57.73 
091010 3,855.36 5,537.33 1,681.98 43.63 
091030 5.102 7.81 2.708 53.08 
091040 181.4 236.008 54.608 30.10 
091099 28.689 39.717 11.028 38.44 
110100 14.558 23.21 8.652 59.43 
110430 15.529 19.663 4.134 26.62 
120400 355.776 388.617 32.841 9.23 
190590 455.998 455.504 -0.494 -0.11 
200290 5.565 7.548 1.983 35.63 
220300 197.466 442.351 244.885 124.01 
220890 4.898 13.257 8.359 170.66 
230220 531.476 829.57 298.094 56.09 
230230 650.506 821.639 171.133 26.31 
230240 141.315 178.492 37.177 26.31 
230250 260.443 329.957 69.514 26.69 
230400 45.011 69.174 24.163 53.68 
230500 26.201 33.094 6.893 26.31 
230610 11.864 14.985 3.121 26.31 
230620 17.177 21.696 4.519 26.31 
230630 32.466 41.007 8.541 26.31 
230650 26.208 42.64 16.432 62.70 
230690 1,328.06 1,678.59 350.539 26.39 
230990 7,427.25 10,251.54 2,824.29 38.03 
251511 9.643 13.05 3.407 35.33 
251512 61.157 82.732 21.575 35.28 
281700 2.933 4.036 1.103 37.61 
320413 37.711 45.841 8.13 21.56 
330119 13.468 18.814 5.346 39.69 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change  
in Export 
330300 20.885 24.542 3.657 17.51 
330510 2.496 2.496 0 0.00 
330741 24.021 28.194 4.173 17.37 
340119 1,486.05 1,477.54 -8.513 -0.57 
381220 4,980.98 7,439.91 2,458.94 49.37 
391530 19.695 24.056 4.361 22.14 
391590 26.282 32.569 6.287 23.92 
391710 239.808 283.924 44.116 18.40 
391721 7,376.78 8,473.48 1,096.69 14.87 
391722 7.728 9.112 1.384 17.91 
391723 1,012.38 1,166.12 153.743 15.19 
391729 2,190.53 2,552.11 361.582 16.51 
391731 386.97 453.856 66.886 17.28 
391732 13.558 16.57 3.012 22.22 
391739 12.082 14.769 2.687 22.24 
391740 76.195 112.505 36.31 47.65 
391810 19.501 23.798 4.297 22.03 
391910 185.471 226.304 40.833 22.02 
391990 77.922 95.305 17.383 22.31 
392010 598.614 730.047 131.433 21.96 
392020 2,639.63 3,204.29 564.661 21.39 
392030 35.386 43.171 7.785 22.00 
392059 7.588 9.275 1.687 22.23 
392069 49.745 61.558 11.813 23.75 
392071 13.046 15.855 2.809 21.53 
392073 21.223 25.609 4.386 20.67 
392099 158.863 196.484 37.621 23.68 
392111 9.197 11.232 2.035 22.13 
392112 47.425 57.885 10.46 22.06 
392113 39.387 48.7 9.313 23.64 
392119 62.281 76.051 13.77 22.11 
392190 180.367 223.16 42.793 23.73 
392310 58.849 86.809 27.96 47.51 
392321 8,894.20 12,376.72 3,482.52 39.15 
392329 2,108.32 3,078.40 970.079 46.01 
392330 276.019 407.125 131.106 47.50 
392350 2,559.46 3,738.64 1,179.18 46.07 
392390 827.245 1,218.68 391.431 47.32 
392410 6.912 9.599 2.687 38.87 
392490 1.735 2.569 0.834 48.07 
392510 31.53 46.539 15.009 47.60 
392610 1.812 2.682 0.87 48.01 
392620 9.574 14.059 4.485 46.85 
392630 6.262 9.255 2.993 47.80 
392640 15.742 23.246 7.504 47.67 
392690 1,388.36 2,044.98 656.621 47.29 
400510 69.329 137.081 67.752 97.73 
401610 51.079 99.525 48.446 94.85 
401693 4.351 6.557 2.206 50.70 
401699 147.464 222.221 74.757 50.70 
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Tariff  
Line Code 
Export Before 
($ '000) 
Export After 
($ '000) 
Change In Export 
($ '000) 
% Change  
in Export 
401700 19.778 39.1 19.322 97.69 
460210 87.322 111.276 23.954 27.43 
460290 2.018 2.774 0.756 37.46 
490110 35.021 42.05 7.029 20.07 
500310 4.972 6.61 1.638 32.94 
500390 40.434 54.551 14.117 34.91 
500400 35.815 48.933 13.118 36.63 
500710 26.513 36.42 9.907 37.37 
500720 34.043 46.501 12.458 36.59 
500790 658.349 898.944 240.595 36.55 
640110 36.628 48.13 11.502 31.40 
640191 11.392 15.01 3.618 31.76 
640199 48.357 63.824 15.467 31.99 
640411 172.971 227.895 54.924 31.75 
640419 2,302.05 2,720.05 418.002 18.16 
640520 0.969 1.279 0.31 31.99 
640590 0.419 0.506 0.087 20.76 
680221 528.487 722.408 193.921 36.69 
701329 28.465 38.91 10.445 36.69 
721030 1,652.78 2,506.76 853.984 51.67 
721041 11,924.80 15,901.40 3,976.60 33.35 
721049 6,008.42 9,377.08 3,368.66 56.07 
721070 310.995 491.487 180.492 58.04 
721720 448.145 694.09 245.945 54.88 
740811 200.989 200.042 -0.947 -0.47 
740819 91.188 90.049 -1.139 -1.25 
850110 1.346 1.58 0.234 17.38 
851629 0.113 0.131 0.018 15.93 
854411 3,968.89 3,965.50 -3.387 -0.09 
870190 162.196 225.116 62.92 38.79 
903039 1.387 1.71 0.323 23.29 
 
